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This thesis presents an analysis of the South African Parliament’s attempts to create a 
mechanism to enable oversight of delegated legislation.   
The question sought to be addressed is, whether Parliament has done anything to create a 
mechanism to oversee the delegation of its law-making authority to the executive and if so, 
whether any of these efforts have been successful.   
This paper illustrated how the making of delegated legislation is not foreign to South Africa’s 
system of separation of powers as provided for in our Constitution and as interpreted by our 
courts. 
It is shown how, despite what the Constitution allows, recent law-making efforts have not 
strengthened Parliament’s ability to oversee delegated legislation. Instead legislators 
purposefully sought to curb attempts to improve rule-making and delegated legislation.    
Similarly, efforts to make delegated legislation more accessible to the public have been 
missing from government’s list of priorities.  
The South African Parliament’s efforts to scrutinise delegated legislation is contrasted with 
the efforts of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature and several foreign legislatures.  
Finally, it is indicated how Parliament, after more than 20 years since the promulgation of the 
final Constitution, has failed to create a permanent mechanism to enhance and strengthen its 















1. Introduction  
The rise of the modern administrative state has led to a blurring of the separation of powers 
as traditionally understood. However, arguably the separation was never that rigid to begin 
with.  
Having to govern on the minutiae of all aspects of a modern society – from tax rules to road 
sign regulations – means that already overburdened legislatures have had to delegate their 
legislative powers to executive functionaries. However convenient, this delegation also has 
its perils and many legislatures across the world have implemented measures to ensure a level 
of oversight over the delegation of its law-making authority. 
In South Africa there have been two serious attempts by Parliament – one pre-1994 and one 
post-1994 – to introduce a mechanism which would enable such oversight.  
The final Constitution specifically allows for the creation of such mechanisms, but in the 20 
years since the promulgation of the Constitution, progress has been very slow, if not 
insignificant.  
The Gauteng Provincial Legislature is the only legislature in the country which has 
successfully enacted legislation to provide for scrutiny of delegated legislation.  
This dissertation examines this aspect of the constitutional system in South Africa and 
discusses in detail the pre- and post-Constitution attempts by Parliament to implement a 
mechanism for the scrutiny of delegated legislation, as well as attempts to improve access to 
delegated legislation.  
It examines briefly how other democracies have designed their scrutiny mechanisms and 










2. Delegated Legislation and the Separation of Powers  
Any discussion on the concept of the separation of powers invariably invokes the words of 
the French political philosopher and lawyer Charles-Louis de Sécondat de Montesquieu, 
commonly known as Montesquieu.  
He wrote in the L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws), Volume 1:1 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to 
the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. 
 
Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois in turn ‘deeply influenced’ the framers of the United States 
Constitution.2  The design of the US political system embraces the separation of the executive 
and legislative branches to a much greater degree than Westminster-style parliaments. For 
instance, in the US the president is directly elected and not elected by a majority in the 
legislature.   
However, James Madison - the 4th President of the United States, and one of the authors of 
the Federalist Papers - understood that there could not be a complete separation of power 
between the different government branches.  
Madison argued that Montesquieu had not meant that the branches ‘ought to have no 
PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of the other.’3 Rather, the danger 
lies ‘where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which 
possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution are subverted.’4  
During the negotiations for a new constitution to transition South Africa from a country ruled 
by a minority to a constitutional democracy, the extent to which the branches of government 
                                                          
1 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Law, Volume 1, Chapter VI. 
2 McClean, I and McMillian, A Concise Dictionary of Politics (2003) at 354. 
3 Madison, J 1788 ‘The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its 
Different Parts’ Federalist No. 47. 
4 Ibid.   
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needed to be separate was one of the many issues with which the framers of the new 
constitutional order had to grapple.  
In the early 1990s South Africa’s road towards a new political order was characterised by 
several collapsed attempts at reaching consensus, but by 1993, after the signing of a Record 
of Understanding between the government of the day and the African National Congress, the 
Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) undertook to reach a settlement on the country’s 
new constitutional order.5 
In November 1993 the MPNP agreed on the text of the interim Constitution and 34 binding 
Constitutional Principles which would act as a framework for the final Constitution.6 
Section 71(2) of the interim Constitution7 stated that the Constitutional Court needed to 
certify that all the provisions of the interim text complied with the 34 Constitutional 
Principles before it would have any force and effect. 
Constitutional Principle VI required that there ‘shall be a separation of powers between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.’8 The extent and nature of the separation was 
for the participants to the process to negotiate and decide.  
During the first attempt at certifying the final constitution, the Constitutional Court pointed 
out that there exists ‘no universal model of separation of powers’.9 The Court made this 
observation when it was addressing an objection to various provisions of the proposed new 
Constitution for its failure to ‘effect full separation of powers’.10 The principal objection was 
to the provision which allowed members of executive government to remain members of 
legislatures in all three spheres of government.  
In addressing this concern, the Court said:  
  
The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises the functional 
independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of checks and 
balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a totality, 
prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one another. In this 
sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of 
                                                          
5 Spitz, R and Chaskalson, M The Politics of Transition (2000) at 32.  
6 Currie, I & De Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2016) at 5. 
7 200 of 1993 
8 Ibid at Schedule 4. 
9 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South Africa1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 
para 108 
10 Ibid at para 106. 
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another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the 
scheme is always one of partial separation.11  
 
Although the final Constitution12 does not expressly provide for the separation of powers, 
chapters four, five, and eight set out the powers of the national assembly, the president and 
the national executive, and the judiciary respectively.  
In this way the separation of powers in our Constitution is similar to that of the United States, 
‘based on inferences drawn from the structure and provisions of the Constitution, rather than 
on an express entrenchment of the principle.’13  
For the purposes of this study, the nature of the separation between the legislature and the 
executive is relevant.  
The Constitution vests the legislative authority of the national sphere of government in the 
National Assembly (NA)14 and gives it the power to pass legislation on any matter, excluding 
– barring certain circumstances – those listed as areas of ‘exclusive provincial legislative 
competence’.15  
Besides amending the Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to assign its 
legislative powers to any legislative body in another sphere of government.16 Amongst the 
powers given to the National Assembly is the power to ‘consider, pass, amend or reject any 
legislation before the Assembly’.17 
The Constitution also gives the National Assembly the important role of overseeing the 
national executive authority, requiring it to provide for mechanisms:  
a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are 
accountable to it; and 
b) to maintain oversight of – 
i. the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of 
legislation; and 
ii. any organ of state.18 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid at para 109.  
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
13 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) at para 21. 
14 Section 43(a) of the Constitution (n12). 
15 Ibid section 44(1)(a)(ii). 
16 Ibid section 44(1)(a)(iii). 
17 Ibid section 55(1). 
18 Ibid section 55(2). 
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The constitutional obligation on the legislature to keep the executive accountable is re-
emphasised when the Constitution deals with accountability and the responsibilities of 
cabinet members. Members of the cabinet ‘are accountable collectively and individually to 
Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.’19 They 
are also mandated to ‘provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters 
under their control.’20 
The Constitution’s first reference to delegated legislation is in section 101(3) under executive 
decisions, where it is requires that ‘[p]roclamations, regulations and other instruments of 
subordinate legislation must be accessible to the public.’ 
In addition, section 101(4) states: 
National legislation may specify the manner in which, and the extent to which, 
instruments mentioned in subsection (3) must be – 
(a) tabled in Parliament; and  
(b) approved by Parliament.21 
 
The ‘instruments of subordinate legislation’ referred to here is legislation made by the 
executive government (or its functionaries) through a delegation of Parliament’s law-making 
authority in a permitting provision contained in an act of Parliament. These instruments, 
when made in terms of an act of Parliament, have the same status as national legislation.22  
This type of legislation goes by many names: delegated legislation, subordinate legislation, 
secondary legislation, legislative instruments, and so forth.  
This study will refer to ‘delegated legislation’ or simply ‘instrument’, unless a particular 
institution under discussion uses a different term. 
Examples of instruments of delegated legislation are: rules, orders, tariffs, ordinances, 
proclamations, directives, declarations, schemes, and perhaps the best known, regulations. 
The procedures through which these instruments are made are often referred to as ‘rule-
making’. 
                                                          
19 Ibid section 92(2). 
20 Ibid section 92(3)(b). 
21 For provincial legislatures these sections are mirrored in section 114(2) (powers of provincial legislatures), 
section 133(2) (accountability and responsibility of the executive council) and sections 140(3) and (4) 
(executive decisions) of the final Constitution. 
22 Section 239 of the Constitution (n12). 
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Although it is done often, the Constitution does not actually have a provision which explicitly 
states whether it allows original legislatures the power to confer delegated legislative powers 
on other organs of state (and neither did the interim Constitution). According to Du Plessis 
the ‘oblique reference’ to delegated legislation in section 101(3) quoted above can ‘certainly 
not be construed as an authorisation to enact them, but it is at least constitutional recognition 
of the fact that they (can) somehow exist.'23  
However, Du Plessis then argues that the power of original legislatures to grant delegated 
legislative powers could be considered as ‘implicitly included in the legislative powers that 
the Constitution expressly grants them.'24  
In a political system that incorporates the separation of powers, the fact that the executive 
branch can make legislation should offend our notion that the legislature is the law-making 
authority of the Republic, yet different types of delegated legislation abound and are 
mentioned in the Constitution itself.  
Prior to the arrival of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the South African Parliament 
was supreme and the view was that Parliament could ‘delegate as much power as it liked’.25 
For instance, section 25(1) of the Black Administration Act26 allowed the State President to 
amend or repeal ‘any law then in force’. These types of provisions are referred to as ‘Henry 
VIII clauses’ named for the Statute of Proclamations (1539) which gave King Henry VIII of 
England the power to legislate by proclamation.27  
Evidently this type of power delegation is offensive to South Africa’s new constitutional 
system with its defined powers for the different branches of government, yet in 1995 - before 
the promulgation of the final Constitution, but after the interim Constitution - Parliament 
amended the Local Government Transition Act28 to include a section which allowed the 
President to amend the Act and any schedule thereto by proclamation in the Government 
Gazette.29  
Following the amendment of the Act, the President exercised this power by amending the 
Transition Act through a proclamation, transferring control over the local government 
                                                          
23 Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statues (2002) at 48. 
24 Ibid at 48. 
25 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) at 263. 
26 38 of 1927. 
27 UK Parliament Glossary. 
28 209 of 1993. 
29 Ibid at section 16A. 
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delimitation process from the provincial governments to the national government. This action 
was challenged in Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic 
of South Africa.30  
The Constitutional Court ruled that Parliament could not constitutionally delegate the power 
to amend acts of Parliament to the executive and that the delegation in section 16A(1) of the 
Local Government Transition Act was impermissible.31 
The Court stated that the Constitution’s provisions prescribing how laws are to be made and 
changed are not ‘merely directory’ and are ‘part of scheme which guarantees the participation 
of both houses in the exercise of the legislative authority vested in Parliament under the 
Constitution’.32 
Although the case revolved around the constitutionality of a Henry VIII-type clause, the 
Court unsurprisingly touched on whether the executive’s power to make delegated legislation 
would be permissible under the new constitutional order, according to Chaskalson:   
In a modern state detailed provisions are often required for the purpose of implementing 
and regulating laws, and Parliament cannot be expected to deal with all such matters 
itself. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits Parliament from delegating 
subordinate regulatory authority to other bodies. The power to do so is necessary for 
effective law-making. It is implicit in the power to make laws for the country and I have 
no doubt that under our Constitution parliament can pass legislation delegating such 
legislative functions to other bodies.33  
 
Delegating authority to make subordinate legislation within the framework of an enabling act 
is therefore allowed, assigning plenary legislative power to another body is not.34 
Referring to Chaskalson’s comment that the Constitution does not prohibit delegated 
legislation, Du Plessis said, ‘[h]e could have put it more boldly.’35 
In Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others36 Chaskalson did just 
that, stating that allowing members of the executive to make delegated legislation was an 
                                                          
30 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC). 
31 Ibid at para 126. 
32 Ibid at para 62. 
33 Ibid at para 51. 
34 Ibid at para 51. 
35 Du Plessis op cit (n23) 48. 
36 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC). 
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‘essential part of public administration’ and provides the ‘detailed infrastructure’ according to 
which the policies of the legislature are given effect.37  
Therefore, although this law-making delegation is in a strict sense a contravention of the 
principle of the separation of powers, it is one that is ‘indispensable for the flexible and 
expeditious governmental response to unforeseen developments in the reality of daily life.’38 
The legislature ‘cannot directly exert its will in every detail’, but lays down the outline.39  
Administrators are therefore ‘an essential part of public administration’ and essentially end 
up making more law than the legislature itself.40 
Administrative law doctrine distinguishes between two types of administrative conduct, 
‘adjudication’ and ‘rule-making’ the latter which results in delegated legislation.41 An 
executive functionary can therefore administer and legislate; what matters is ‘not so much the 
functionary as the function.’42 
One can distinguish these acts by calling a ‘legislative act’ the ‘issuing of instructions which 
have a general application’ and an ‘executive act’ the ‘issuing of a specific instruction to an 
individual.’43 
However, in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council and Others44 the Constitutional Court ruled that when a functionary 
acts in terms of a delegated provision, for instance when making regulations, the result is 
‘legislation’, but the process of making the legislation, is in substance ‘administrative’.45 
Section 33 of the final Constitution provides for the right to ‘just administrative action’ and in 
2000 the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act46 (PAJA) was promulgated to give effect to 
the rights in this section.  
                                                          
37 Ibid para 11. 
38 Parliament of South Africa ‘Interim Report of Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation on Scrutiny of 
Delegated Legislation’ (2002) at 2.  
39 Bezuidenhout v Road Accident Fund 2003 (6) SA 61 (SCA) para 10.  
40 Hoexter op cit (n25) 25.  
41 Hoexter, op cit (n25) 51. 
42 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 
(CCT16/98) [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1; 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (10 September 1999) para 141. 
43 Griffith Principles of Administrative Law (1973).  
44 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para 27. 
45 Ibid at para 27. 
46 3 of 2000. 
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There is no question that PAJA covers adjudication, but whether it applies to ‘rule-making’ 
has been matter of ‘considerable dispute’.47  
Chaskalson referred to the Fedsure judgment in the New Clicks48case when he ruled that 
legislative administrative action was included in the definition of ‘administrative action’ in 
section 33(1) of the Constitution49 and that the making of regulations in the case before the 
court constituted administrative action within the meaning of the PAJA.50  
Chaskalson pronounced that: 
The Constitution calls for open and transparent government, and requires public 
participation in the making of laws by Parliament and deliberative legislative assemblies. 
To hold that the making of delegated legislation is not part of the right to just 
administrative action would be contrary to the Constitution’s commitment to open and 
transparent government.51 
 
However, as Hoextra points out, in New Clicks only five other justices found that PAJA was 
applicable to regulation-making and it was only Justice O’Regan who concurred fully with 
the Chief Justice.52   
Part of the reason for the confusion is that an early draft of the bill that eventually became 
PAJA, the Administrative Justice Bill (which will be more thoroughly discussed in the next 
chapter), included the word ‘rule’ amongst the definitions and defined it as:  
…any measure with the force of law applying generally or to a group or class of persons, 
including subordinate legislation made in terms of an Act of Parliament or in terms of 
provincial legislation, but does not include a law made by Parliament, a provincial 
legislature or a municipal council.53  
 
Ultimately the term ‘rule’ was not included as a definition in the version of the 
Administrative Justice Bill that the executive introduced to Parliament and was also not 
reintroduced by the portfolio committee during the deliberations. The final version of PAJA 
also did not include ‘rule-making’ in its definition of ‘decision’ (the definition of ‘decision’ 
was not even in the Administrative Justice Bill when it was introduced in Parliament). 
                                                          
47 Currie The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, A Commentary (2007) at 87. 
48 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC). 
49 Ibid at para 118. 
50 New Clicks op sit (n36) para 135. 
51 Ibid para 113. 
52 Hoexter op cit (n25) at 200. 
53South African Law Commission ‘Project 115, Administrative Justice Report’ (August 1999) Draft Bill at 
section 1(n) at 20. 
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The change to the definitions in the Bill was in part an attempt to limit the Act’s coverage of 
rule-making.54 Arguably the notice and comment procedures contained in section four 
indicate that PAJA is meant to cover rule-making, because notice and comment procedures 
were developed specifically to allow public participation in rule-making.55  
Nonetheless, even before the promulgation of the Constitution and PAJA, O’Regan argued 
that administrative law should adopt mechanisms to ensure that delegated legislation ‘is fair, 
efficient, rational, and seen to be rational.’56 
She proposed a whole raft of options, including:  
…structuring of rule-making institutions to enable public or interest-group participation; 
the adoption of procedures requiring notification and consultation prior to the making of 
subordinate legislation; the giving of reasons for the legislation adopted; the 
establishment of a central drafting office to which all subordinate legislation should be 
referred prior to promulgation; effective legislative scrutiny of subordinate legislation; 
compulsory, periodic review of all subordinate legislation; the introduction of a national 
register of subordinate legislation; and, of course, the adoption of appropriate standards 
of judicial review for subordinate legislation.57 
 
This study will review specifically two of the options proposed by O’Regan, namely effective 















                                                          
54 Currie & Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) at 83. 
55 Ibid at 84. 
56 O’Regan, ‘Rules for Rule-making: Administrative Law and Subordinate Legislation’ in Administrative Law 
Reform (1993) at 168. 
57 Ibid at 168. 
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3. Existing and Proposed Statutory Measures  
 
3.1 Tabling of Delegated Legislation  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, since the enactment of the interim Constitution our 
courts have ruled that the making of delegated legislation by the executive is entirely 
consistent with South Africa’s unique constitutional design.   
While delegated legislation is now viewed as an ‘essential part of public administration’,58 
there is still a danger that the delegation of law-making power can lead to, amongst other 
things, abuses of power, the encroachment or violation of rights, and the substandard or 
substantively inaccurate drafting of law instruments.59 Uncontrolled delegated legislation 
‘offers a fertile field for government despotism and bossy interference by bureaucrats.’60 
Besides the power to make delegated legislation and exercise discretionary powers, 
administrators are regularly given the power to ‘flesh out statutes by making additional 
policy’.61  
Governments might prefer to make policy through, for instance, regulations, because it is 
easier to avoid what comes with the parliamentary process: visibility, public participation, 
media attention, debate, and opposition.62 
One of the ways in which the Constitution seeks to protect against the unfettered use of 
delegated legislation by government is by allowing for national legislation which may specify 
the manner in which, and the extent to which, proclamations, regulations and other 
instruments of delegated legislation must be tabled in Parliament63 and approved by 
Parliament.64 However, since the promulgation of the final Constitution, no such legislation 
has been forthcoming.  
                                                          
58 New Clicks op cit (n36) para 113. 
59 Klaaren & Sibanda ‘Introducing the Gauteng Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation Act: notes and comments’ 
(2009) at 164.  
60 Hamer, B 'Chapter 9: Parliamentary control of delegated legislation' (2004). 
61 Hoexter (n25) at 27. 
62 Neudorf ‘Rule by Regulation: Revitalizing Parliament’s Supervisory Role in the Making of Subordinate 
Legislation’ (2016) at 29.  
63 Section 101(4)(a) of Constitution (n12).  
64 Ibid at section 101(4)(b). 
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The primary purpose of tabling a written instrument in Parliament is to account to Parliament 
and is an important part of the process of ‘ensuring accountability and openness of 
government.’65 
Once a paper has been tabled in Parliament, it becomes a public document66 and promotes a 
number of constitutional requirements: 
 it makes Parliament a national forum for the public consideration of issues;67 
 it gives effect to the requirement that members of the cabinet must provide Parliament 
with full an regular reports concerning matters under their control;68 
 it enables the National Assembly to ensure that all executive organs of state in the 
national sphere of government are accountable to it;69 and  
 it enables the National Assembly to maintain oversight of the exercise of national 
executive authority, including the implementation of legislation, and any organ of 
state.70  
 
There are many statutes that require the tabling of certain documents in Parliament, 
including, but not limited to: international agreements, white and green papers, strategic 
plans, annual performance plans, annual reports, and instruments of delegated legislation.  
Requiring the tabling of delegated legislation in Parliament is ‘[t]he classic device developed 
for the purpose of counterbalancing the delegation of legislative power.’71 
In the absence of any specific post-Constitution legislation on the tabling of instruments of 
delegated legislation, the Interpretation Act of 195772 applies.  
This Act requires that when rules and regulations are made pursuant to a provision in a law, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a list of the proclamations, 
government notices, and provincial notices under which such rules or regulations were 
published in the Gazette shall be submitted to Parliament or the provincial legislature, within 
fourteen days after the publication of the rules or regulations in the Gazette.73  
                                                          
65 Parliament of South Africa ‘Guide to tabling of papers in Parliament’ (2011) at 7.  
66 Ibid at 7. 
67 Section 42(3) and (4) of Constitution (n12). 
68 Section 92(3)(b) ibid.  
69 Section 55(2)(a) ibid.  
70 Section 55(2)(b) ibid.  
71 Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 255. 
72 33 of 1957 
73 Ibid section 17. 
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In each case the number, date, and title of the proclamation, government notice or provincial 
notice, and the number and date of the Gazette in which it was published, needs to be stated.74 
The Act does not require the tabling of the actual text of the instrument.   
Therefore, when individual acts do not indicate whether it is necessary for delegated 
legislation to be tabled in Parliament, the provisions of the Interpretation Act applies. 
However, in Bloem v State President of the Republic of South Africa75 it was ruled that the 
provisions referred to above concerning the time within which regulations have to be tabled: 
…are not peremptory but merely directory, aimed at expediting their laying before 
Parliament but not intended to annul or invalidate them for non-compliance, and that the 
regulations have consequently not ceased to be of force or effect by reason of the failure 
to table them as aforesaid. To my mind they therefore continue to apply and are still of 
full force and effect despite such failure.76 
 
The current Interpretation Act’s tabling requirements are more lenient than the Act’s 
forebears. The Cape Colony’s77 Interpretation Act78 stated that when the Governor is 
authorised by an act to make delegated legislation ‘copies of such rules, orders or regulations 
shall be laid before both House of Parliament within thirty days after the making thereof’.79 
After the creation of the Union of South Africa, the Union Parliament’s Interpretation Act80 
required the about the same: ‘copies of such rules and regulations shall be laid upon the tables 
of both Houses of Parliament, within fourteen days after the publication of the rules or 
regulations in the Gazette’.81 
Although the current Interpretation Act only requires that functionaries table a notification 
containing the details of the delegated legislation it made, Parliament does request that 
departments attach a copy of the Government Gazette wherein the instruments was published 
when the notification is tabled.82  
                                                          
74 Ibid section 17.  
75 1986 (4) SA 1064 (O).  
76 Ibid at 1089G – 1091A. 
77 This was before the unification of South Africa in 1910.  
78 5 of 1883 (C). 
79 Ibid at section VIII. 
80 1910. 
81 Ibid section 17. 
82 Guide to tabling of papers in Parliament (n65) at 15. 
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Besides the requirements of the Interpretation Act, many individual statutes prescribe specific 
rules for the tabling, discussion, or approval by Parliament of delegated legislation made 
under the authority of the specific statute.  
For instance, the Promotion of Access to Information Act83 requires that any regulation made 
in terms of section 92(1) of the Act, must, before publication in the Government Gazette, be 
submitted to Parliament.84  
The PAJA85 requires that certain regulations made in terms of the Act must be submitted to 
Parliament before publication in the Gazette, others are even subject to approval by 
Parliament before publication in the Gazette.86  
Similarly, section 10(3) of the Protected Disclosures Act87 requires that any regulations made 
in terms of the Act must be submitted to Parliament before publication in the Government 
Gazette. 
In terms of section 75(6)(a) of the National Road Traffic Act88 draft regulations must be 
referred to Parliament for comment, in addition to being published in the Government 
Gazette with a call for comments.   
Section 38(2) of the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Act89 states that any 
regulation made in terms of section 39(2) of the Act, must be submitted to Parliament at least 
30 days before its publication in the Gazette. 
Other statutes contain similar provisions; the list goes on.  
In 2006 the South African Law Reform Commission published a Discussion Paper90 on the 
review of the Interpretation Act. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
had requested that the parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation be considered as part of 
the investigation and the discussion paper treated it as a ‘collateral issue’.91  
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The Commission proposed the Interpretation of Legislation Bill92 for discussion. The Bill 
would require that, after its publication in the Gazette, or in a permissible alternative manner, 
delegated legislation had to be submitted to both houses of Parliament for delegated national 
legislation or the relevant provincial legislature for delegated provincial legislation.93  
Ultimately, the Bill was toothless. Non-compliance with the tabling provision would ‘not 
affect (sic) the validity, commencement, or enforcement of such subordinate legislation.’94  
The Discussion Paper only reflected the Commission’s preliminary views and was aimed at 
eliciting more responses.  
At the end of 2017 the Commission was in the process of considering the draft report on the 
review of the Interpretation Act. After the Commission’s amendments to the draft report, the 
final report will be submitted to the Minister and the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development for comment. Thereafter the draft will again be updated and will serve before 
the Commission for final approval.95 
The more than ten year delay between the publication of the Discussion Paper and the 
finalisation of a draft report can be attributed to the Commission’s decision to prioritise a 
project on the review of all national legislation for compliance with the equality provisions of 
the Constitution.96 
As the report has not yet been finalised, it is unclear whether the Commission will 
recommend, as its 2006 discussion paper suggested, amending the Interpretation Act to make 
tabling mandatory. 
3.2 Lost Opportunity of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act  
In 1993, during the same time that the Multi-Party Negotiating Process was ongoing, a three-
day conference on administrative justice took place in Cape Town and resulted in the 
‘Breakwater Declaration: Administrative Law for a Future South Africa’. 
One of the areas of agreement of the conference was that:  
Legal regulation of public power should include judicial review of administrative action 
as well as a range of procedures and institutions to ensure good governance, including:  
                                                          
92 Discussion Paper 112 op cit (n90) 467. 
93 Ibid Addendum A, section 13(1) at 475. 
94 Ibid Addendum A, section 13(2) at 475 





i. Effective parliamentary control and supervision of the nature and scope of 
delegated power and the way in which it is exercised.97 
 
In the same year the interim Constitution was drafted and the right to administrative justice 
was phrased as follows: 
Every person shall have the right to- 
a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or 
threatened; 
b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or legitimate 
expectations is affected or threatened; 
c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of his 
or her rights or interests unless the reasons for such action have been made public; 
and 
d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where 
any of his or her rights is affected or threatened.98 
 
This wording of this section was significantly amended and eventually became section 33 of 
the final Constitution, the right to Just Administrative Action:  
1. Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
2. Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
3. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must - 
a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, 
an independent and impartial tribunal; 
b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); 
and 
c) promote an efficient administration.99 
 
The legislation contemplated in section 33(3) had to be enacted by 3 February 2000.100 The 
final Constitution required that, before the promulgation of the envisaged legislation, section 
33(1) and (2) of the final Constitution would be read as section 24 of the interim 
Constitution.101 
In November 1998 the South African Law Commission (SALC) was asked to draft the 
legislation as required by section 33(3). In August 1999 the Commission presented its final 
                                                          
97 Bennett (1993) Administrative Law Reform at 19. 
98 Section 24 of Interim Constitution (n7). 
99 Section 33 of the Final Constitution (n12). 
100 Schedule 6, section 23(1) of Interim Constitution (n7). 
101 Schedule 6, section 23(2) of Final Constitution (n12). 
22 
 
report and a final revised bill, the ‘Administrative Justice Bill’ (hereafter referred to as the 
‘Draft Bill’). 
The Draft Bill was in its sixth version,102 but it was still to undergo many more changes 
before it became the Administrative Justice Bill103 as introduced in Parliament by the 
executive (hereafter referred to as the ‘Executive’s Bill’) in 1999 and then subsequently 
passed by Parliament as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in 2000.104 
The first chapters of the Draft Bill and the Executive’s Bill correspond for the most part, but 
the Draft Bill’s chapters providing for ‘Rules and Standards’105 and the ‘Administrative 
Review Council’106 was cut or watered down in the Executive’s Bill.  
The ‘Rules and Standards’ chapter of the Draft Bill mandated the Chief State Law Advisor to 
‘compile and publish protocols for the drafting of rules and standards’.107 The Chief State 
Law Advisor would also be tasked with, in conjunction with an Administrative Review 
Council, providing training to those drafting the rules and standards.108  
A proposal by SALC for a Central Drafting Office - with its main task to ‘consider and 
approve the text of rules (but not standards) which organs of state intend making’109 - did not 
even make it into the final version of the Draft Bill because the Department of Justice thought 
that several specially appointed State Law Advisors could perform this function ‘better and 
more cheaply’.110 
The Draft Bill also required that when a decision was made to make a rule, an administrator 
had to ‘take appropriate steps to communicate the rule to those likely to be affected by it’.111 
It required compliance with any rules regulating the procedure for the publication of rules and 
allowed for variation of the rules in certain circumstances.112  
Section 13 of the Draft Bill required the creation of up-to-date registers and indexes of rules 
and standards.113 This proposal will be discussed in more extensively in chapter seven.  
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The chapter dealing with the duties of the Chief State Law Advisor, publication of rules, and 
the registers and indexes of rules and standards, was substantially revised before it was 
published in the Draft Bill in an attempt to ‘balance the disadvantages of complying with its 
requirements and procedures (e.g. costs, delays, unnecessary work, unintended consequences) 
and the advantages (transparency, responsiveness, contemporaneity) of doing so.’114 
The chapter on the Administrative Review Council in the Draft Bill envisaged the 
establishment of an Administrative Review Council which would inquire into and make 
recommendations for reform on various administrative law issues. This included, but was not 
nearly limited to, the appropriateness of establishing tribunals to review administrative 
actions115 and prescribing measures for the automatic lapsing of rules and standards.116   
In the Executive’s Bill the chapters on Rules and Standards and the Advisory Council was 
removed and it instead gave the Minister the discretion to establish (through regulations) an 
Advisory Council to advise him or her on the publication of uniform rules and standards, the 
compilation and maintenance of registers, measures for automatic lapsing of rules and 
standards and so forth.117  
The definition of ‘rule’, which included ‘subordinate legislation’, was also left out.118  
The Executive’s Bill underwent several more changes during the parliamentary deliberation 
process of which the most significant was the revision of the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ and the addition of ‘decision’ and ‘empowering provision’. The Committee also made 
changes to the provisions dealing with procedural fairness.  
It was eventually passed by Parliament as PAJA119 on the 3rd of February 2000. 
During the development of the Draft Bill there was some ‘understandable aversion’, 
especially from the Department of Justice, to the creation of another government structure – 
the initially proposed Administrative Review Council. According the Department’s 
calculations at the time, the Council would have cost R980 000 per year to run, out of a 
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budget of R300 million.120 Adjusted for inflation, R900 0000 on the 1st of August 1999, 
amounted to roughly R2 444 562 in July 2017.121 
Besides the narrowing of the definition of administrative action and the attempts exclude the 
act of rule-making from the scope of the Act, the changes made to the Draft Bill show that 
even the most benign suggestions to improve rule-making were not allowed to pass into law. 
It is almost as if the drafters of the final version of PAJA ‘were reluctant to admit the 
existence of “legislative” administrative action at all.’122 
For its ‘cautious and indirect approach’ which ‘reduces the prospects for a fully integrated 
system of administrative law - and will do concomitantly less than the version proposed by 
the Law Commission to topple judicial review from its pedestal’,123 Hoexter viewed PAJA as 
an ‘opportunity lost’.124 
After the passing of PAJA, the Minister in September 2000 circulated draft regulations on 
Fair Administrative Procedures and draft regulations on the Administrative Justice Advisory 
Council to selected stakeholders for comment.125  
Since then the Minister promulgated regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures,126 rules 
on the Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Action127 and in January 2017 the 
Minister invited the public to comment on the draft code of Good Administrative Conduct.128 
However, the draft regulations on the Administrative Justice Advisory Council have not been 
taken any further.  
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4. Attempts to Oversee Delegated Legislation in the South 
African Parliament  
4.1 The 1940s 
In the late 1940s, long before the advent of our current constitutional democracy, concerned 
members of Parliament of the Union of South Africa advocated for the creation of a Select 
Committee on Delegated Legislation to investigate mechanisms to oversee delegated 
legislation.   
The prelude to the creation of the Committee in 1947 was characterised by the alarming 
growth of the delegated legislation during the Second World War, the attention attracted by 
the Donoughmore Report129 and concerns raised by the Association of Law Societies, 
organised commerce and industry, and the National Council of Women.130 
At the time General Jan Smuts of the United Party served as Prime Minister and DF Malan 
was the leader of the second largest party in Parliament, the Herenigde Nasionale Party 
(Reunited National Party). 
On 3 April 1947, after an investigation by two Select Committees, the House of Assembly 
appointed a final Select Committee to:  
…enquire into the delegation by Parliament of legislative powers to the executive 
government to be exercised by means of government regulations, and to report upon 
what safeguards may be necessary to secure the constitutional principles of the 
sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of law in respect of the above-mentioned 
matter as well as generally131  
 
The member of Parliament responsible for creating the necessary support for the committee 
was JH Russell. 
One of the more interesting proposals submitted to the Committee on how to deal with 
delegated legislation came from the Association of Law Societies. The Association initially 
advocated for the creation of a permanent committee of Parliament to review all delegated 
legislation and to make recommendations on the recall or amendment thereof. However, 
following further research and consultation, the Association came to the conclusion that the 
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committee as proposed would not be practical, in part, because of the amount of time it would 
require of members of Parliament serving on the committee. 132   
The Association then proposed a bill which would create a special court for the review of 
regulations. The Court would consist of a president and two assessors.133  
The bill proposed that all regulations would be required to be published in the Government 
Gazette with a notice stating that any objections to a regulation would have to be submitted 
within fourteen days of its publication.134  
If no objections were received the regulations were deemed to be law from the date of 
publication or a date specified therein. If more than one person objected to the published 
regulation, the objectors would be put in contact with each other and then within 28 days 
from the publication of the regulation, an assessor would be appointed.135  
A court date would then be determined to hear arguments for and against the regulations. The 
burden of proof would be on the promoter of the regulation to show that it is necessary and in 
the public interest. After the court ratified, amended, or changed a regulation brought before 
it, the court had to report to Parliament, with specific attention to certain factors.136  
The Committee did not accept the Association’s special court, but instead made a final 
recommendation that was ‘remarkably sophisticated’.137 
The Committee recommended the appointment of an officer in Parliament:  
…charged with the duty of scrutinizing all statutory instruments framed under powers 
conferred by statute and to report whether, in his opinion, any of the scrutinised 
instruments merit the attention of the House on any of the following grounds:  
(a) that they appear to make any unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred 
by the Statute under which they are framed; 
(b) that they tend to usurp the control of the House over expenditure and taxation;  
(c) that they tend to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law without explicit 
enactment;  
(d) that for any reason their form or purport calls for elucidation or special 
attention.138 
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To make this safeguard effective, the Report also recommended that a select committee be 
appointed to which the officer’s reports would be referred for consideration.139 
The fact that statutory instruments were to be scrutinised and reported upon to Parliament 
would have, the Committee thought, ‘a salutary effect upon officials entrusted with the duty 
of framing such instruments.’140 
The proposal were accepted by the government at the time and in 1952 the report was 
referred to the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders in order for more specific proposals 
to be formulated.141 
However, the United Party had been defeated by the Herenigde Nasionale Party in the 1948 
South African general election and when the issue was debated again in Parliament in 1955 
and 1957, the rebranded National Party was fully in control of Parliament and the 
executive.142  
After the 1948 election, Russell continued to champion the cause as a member of the 
opposition, waging ‘a determined though ultimately unsuccessful campaign for stricter 
control over the delegation of legislative and executive administrative powers.’143  
Russell continued to press both Prime Ministers DF Malan and JG Strijdom for answers 
regarding the progress made towards the establishment of a scrutinising committee on 
delegated legislation.  
In 1955 Strijdom said in the House that, in conformity with the reply of Malan in 1952, the 
matter had been referred to the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders, but after discussion 
a decision was made to ‘drop the matter’ and therefore government had ‘accordingly decided 
to take no further steps in this connection.’144 
In 1957 – after several years of Nationalist rule - Mr Russell again pleaded for the 
implementation of the 1949 report:  
The very gentlemen who were so ardent and keen to see that unchecked delegation of 
power should be controlled by a scrutinising committee during their period in 
Opposition, when they ascended unexpectedly to the seats of the mighty, when they 
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became Cabinet Ministers, decided that they needed these powers to enforce their 
policies, determined to make use of these powers to fulfil their arbitrary intentions.145   
 
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Strijdom remained defiant that the matter had been dropped.   
In 1983 Baxter wrote about this failed attempt at creating a mechanism for parliamentary 
oversight of delegated legislation: 
In South Africa, where the balance between political parties is much more one-sided, and 
where scrutiny procedures are virtually non-existent, the executive has little if anything 
to fear from Parliament – hence even the duty to lay copies of delegated legislation has 
proved too great an effort.146  
 
4.2 After 1994  
The second attempt at creating a mechanism in Parliament to oversee delegated legislation 
came in the 1990s, after arrival of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.   
The process happened in two phases. In the first phase the Joint Rules Committee created a 
subcommittee – with a NA component and a National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 
component – to investigate the matter of Parliament’s oversight of delegated legislation. In 
the second phase, Parliament passed a motion to create the Interim Joint Committee on 
Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation while the matter was being finalised.  
4.2.1 Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation  
The process of creating a parliamentary mechanism to oversee delegated legislation 
commenced in 1997 following the promulgation of the final Constitution and the inclusion of 
sections 101 and 140 (as discussed in Chapter 2).147  
In February 1997 a delegation from the South African Parliament attended the Fourth 
Commonwealth Conference on Delegated Legislation, which took place in Wellington, New 
Zealand.148  
In its report the delegation recommended that Parliament had to decide whether it would 
scrutinise delegated legislation and if so, what the scope of Parliament’s scrutiny would be.149   
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On the 19th of February 1998 the National Assembly Rules Committee discussed the 
‘complexities involved in delegated legislation’ and concluded that there was a need for a 
Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation to investigate the matter further.150 
In October 1998 the Speaker of the National Assembly asked Professor Hugh Corder of the 
University of Cape Town’s Department of Public Law to compile a report on the methods for 
scrutiny of legislation by Parliament.151   
After Corder submitted progress reports on the 2nd of November 1998 and on the 21st of 
January 1999, he was asked to expand and supplement certain areas.152 
Corder submitted his ‘Final Report on Methods for Scrutiny of Legislation by Parliament’ to 
Parliament on the 2nd of March 1999.153  
The 1999 Joint Rules of Parliament made provision for the Joint Subcommittee on Delegated 
Legislation which would be composed of members of the Assembly Subcommittee on 
Delegated Legislation and members of the Council Subcommittee on Delegated 
Legislation.154  
The Rules required that the Subcommittee:  
a) must investigate and make recommendations to the Joint Rules Committee on 
possible mechanisms that could be used by legislators to maintain oversight of the 
exercise of legislative powers delegated to the executive; and 
b) must perform any other function and may exercise any other power assigned to it by 
the Joint Rules Committee.155  
 
This section of the Rules included a note specifically referring to section 101(4) of the 
Constitution providing for national legislation to determine procedures for subordinate 
legislation to be tabled in and approved by Parliament.156 
In October 1999 the NCOP Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation held an informal meeting 
– at that stage the NCOP had not yet adopted rules to allow the subcommittee to be formally 
constituted – to establish the role of the NCOP, if any, in scrutinising delegated legislation.157  
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One of the members, Ms Pandor, observed that there was some parliamentary scrutiny of 
delegated legislation – for instance portfolio committees which scrutinise regulations – but 
that the discussion was about a formal scrutiny mechanism. She also observed that although 
Corder’s report on this very important issue had been tabled months before, comments from 
political parties had not been forthcoming. 158 
On 11 April 2000 Corder presented his final report to the Joint Subcommittee on Delegated 
Legislation.159  
The report set out some of the most common ways in which legislatures oversee delegated 
legislation, these included:  
 Laying down detailed and restricted guidelines which the enabling provisions which 
give the executive law-making authority, must adhere to; 
 Requiring that all delegated legislation be tabled in Parliament;  
 Subjecting all delegated legislation to a procedure for either approval or disapproval 
by Parliament after examination by a committee against certain standards; and  
 Requiring the executive authority proposing the delegated to undertake some cost-
benefit analysis or impact study.160  
 
When the chairs asked whether Parliament had the power to disallow regulations versus just 
making recommendations, Corder responded that the international norm does allow 
disallowance, but in the context of South Africa it was a grey area. He warned that 
disallowance could ‘sometimes lead to a confrontational relationship between the executive 
and the legislature.’161 
Another concern raised was that there would be duplication of institutions performing 
oversight, but Corder argued that the ‘growing number of institutions that are dealing with 
oversight actually assist in boosting the accountability of the executive to the civic society at 
large.’162 
At the Subcommittees Committee’s meeting in September 2000 there was no quorum as 
members of the NCOP could not attend due to other commitments. At the time most of the 
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members of the Committee also sat on the Justice Portfolio Committee which meant that their 
schedules often clashed.163  
The Committee expressed the need for someone from Parliament's legal services to 
summarise Corder's in-depth report ‘into a more concise and manageable format for the 
members of the committee to discuss.’164 
The Committee also agreed that the Chairperson would apply for the committee to meet when 
the House was in session.165 Time constraints and the availability of members to attend 
meetings would continue to be an issue that plagued the existence of the Subcommittee and 
the Interim Committee.  
At a meeting of the NCOP Rules Committee in March 2000 to discuss a report of the 
Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation, one of the members, Mr Moosa, mentioned that 
given the amount of work that the required for scrutiny the Subcommittee should consider a 
mechanism which would not require members ‘to do the bulk of the work.’166 He suggested a 
unit of lawyers and researchers to ‘provide the necessary support and alert members to 
potential problems.’167 
At meeting in October 2000 of Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation the legal advisors  
explained that there were ‘inconsistencies’ when it came to the scrutiny of delegated 
legislation in South Africa, for instance, not all delegated legislation has to be tabled or 
published in the Gazette.168  
The Chairperson indicated that it was ‘urgent there be principles around delegated legislation’ 
as it was being done on an ‘ad hoc’ basis.169   
The members disagreed on whether a joint committee would be most appropriate for the task. 
One member argued that most of the legislation passed in Parliament was section 75 
legislation and if it were to be a joint committee, the NCOP would be looking at delegated 
legislation ‘that is outside its competency’.170 
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One member, Mr Mathee, suggested that the Subcommittee would need ‘full-time legal 
expertise, as well as specialists in specific areas.’ He also suggested that a registry of 
delegated legislation be made and the Chairperson agreed as currently ‘this information was 
inaccessible’.171  
Another member, Mr Surty, complained that Corder's report should have looked at South 
Africa pre- and post-1994 comparatively and that the Committee had ‘to look at the South 
African situation in practical terms.’ It was suggested that the Committee re-engage with 
Corder to give him more specific instructions as to what they required.172  
The Chairperson felt that Corder's report did not capture the ‘present constitutional 
democracy and its ideals of openness and transparency.’173 
On the 5th of December 2000 municipal elections took place in South Africa, as a result the 
subcommittees did not meet on a regular basis that year. 174  
At a NA Rules Committee meeting in November 2001 two members proposed the 
amalgamation of the Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation and the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Accountability because there was ‘link between the functions of the two 
Subcommittees.’ 175 
The Speaker opposed the idea and said that the committees had been kept separate because of 
the big workload, but despite that, the subcommittees had not produced substantive reports 
for the past two or three years. 176 
The Joint Committee did not meet at all in 2001. 
In 2002 the Joint Subcommittee continue its work with new level of vigour and direction. 
This could possibly be ascribed to the election of two new co-chairpersons, Adv TM Masutha 
(NA) and TS Setona (NCOP).  
At a meeting in January 2002, co-chairperson Setona noted that the Committee had been in 
existence for more than three years, but for a number of reasons had not completed its task, 
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including that members did not prioritise the Committee and that there had been no 
programme in place.177 
At the same meeting the Committee deliberated on what actually constituted delegated 
legislation and also briefly discussed the key areas of the Corder report.178 
The Committee agreed on a programme for the first term of 2002 and decided to organise a 
workshop wherein experts and stakeholders would make submissions.179 
Shortly after the Joint Subcommittee had established its first term programme, it was 
informed that the National Assembly Rules Committee had agreed that the Joint 
Subcommittee, while proceeding to complete its task, had to expedite a separate proposal for 
an interim mechanism for the scrutiny of delegated legislation. This was because the process 
by then had already been a prolonged one.180 
At a meeting on the 5th of February 2002 the NA Rules Committee discussed the scope of 
amendment bills, but the issue of oversight of regulations also came up.181 
The Speaker remarked that ‘in theory committees should set the parameters in legislation 
within which regulations should fall and not give the Executive blank a cheque to draft 
them.’182  
One member, Mr De Lange, commented that through delegated legislation Parliament had 
handed over its legislative power to the executive and it could not take it back and say that it 
should approve all regulations. He referred to other Commonwealth Parliaments which had 
created subcommittees to look at regulations and to ensure that the regulations ‘fall within the 
parameters of the law and are not ultra vires.’183  
The Speaker appealed to parties to take an active interest in the work of the Joint 
Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation and asked the Subcommittee to expedite the 
consideration of an interim mechanism to monitor regulations.184 
In the first half of 2002 the Committee discussed various topics related to the establishment 
of a scrutiny mechanism, including a definition of delegated legislation, scrutiny criteria and 
                                                          
177 Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation 'Committee Programme' (25 January 2002).  
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid.   
180 Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation 'Draft Minutes of Proceedings' (19 February 2002).  
181 National Assembly Rules Committee 'Deliberations' (5 February 2002).  
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid.  
34 
 
mechanisms, access to delegated legislation, whether portfolio and select committees was 
best placed to perform the scrutiny, the scrutiny of provincial and municipal by-laws, the 
automatic lapsing of regulations, whether legislation was needed and other matters related 
thereto.185 
Finally, on the 29th of October 2002, the Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation 
presented its Interim Report to the Joint Rules Committee and proposed the creation of an 
interim mechanism for the scrutiny of delegated legislation.  
The Subcommittee acknowledged that parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation formed 
a ‘critical element in any modern system of constitutional democracy’ and furthermore, had 
the potential to ‘enhance constitutional values and principles, improve the quality of Acts of 
Parliament and save legal costs and court time in the future by anticipating challenges to the 
constitutional validity of such legislation.’186 
The Subcommittee recommended firstly, that legislation be passed setting out norms and 
standards for the implementation of section 101(4) of the Constitution and, secondly, that 
section 17 of the Interpretation Act be reinforced, ‘at least as far as tabling is concerned’.187 
The Subcommittee also recommended that the executive investigate ways to make 
subordinate instruments more accessible, as well as the possibility of the automatic lapsing of 
subordinate instruments after a certain period of time.188  
It was decided that a specialist joint committee would be the most appropriate mechanism for 
the scrutiny of delegated legislation and delegating provisions, as portfolio and select 
committees had time and capacity constraints.189  
The Subcommittee recommended that an interim scrutiny committee be established to:  
 act in an advisory capacity to portfolio and select committees with regard to the 
scrutiny of delegating provisions in enabling statutes referred to it; 
 scrutinise any delegated instruments requiring approval by Parliament; and 
 be provided with the necessary capacity and legal expertise. 190 
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When the Joint Rules Committee met in May 2003 Masutha indicated that Corder had 
expressed his general agreement with the report. Political parties were told to consider the 
report and that another meeting would be held to discuss the report.191  
In August 2003 the Joint Rules Committee met again and it was indicated that the NCOP had 
held a workshop (on the 11th of August 2003) to consider and debate the interim report of the 
Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation and it was suggested that the National 
Assembly conduct a similar workshop, where after the recommendations could be 
considered.192 At the meeting the Deputy Chairperson of the NCOP expressed concern that it 
had been a year since the Report was published, yet there had been no action.193  
The Report was not taken any further in the second Parliament and in April 2004 South 
Africa’s third democratic national election was took place.  
In August 2004, when the Joint Rules Committee of the third Parliament met for the first 
time, the Report was presented to the new members as a legacy issue.194 
The NCOP Subcommittee had held a workshop on the 19th and 20th of September 2004 which 
allowed members to engage with the Report before they had to discuss it in the Joint Rules 
Committee meeting.195 
Although the Joint Rules Committee agreed to receive a presentation on the report at a 
special meeting at the end of August 2004, the meeting only took place on the 25th of May 
2005 because of time constraints.196 
During this meeting Masutha briefed the Joint Rules Committee on the report. Committee 
members were encouraged to consider the recommendations and to return with specific 
responses ‘so that the committee would be in a position to issue instructions on what was 
needed to follow up on agreed positions.’197 
The Joint Rules Committee met again on the 22nd of March 2006. One of the committee 
members suggested that a presentation be made to the executive on this matter, but the 
Speaker was worried that the process would be delayed even further and, according to the 
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minutes, feared that ‘Parliament might be influenced to pander to the wishes of the 
executive.’198 
It was agreed that an interim structure was needed to deal with delegated legislation. The 
Speaker also made an appeal to parties to finalise the matter ‘because it has been around for 
ages.’199 
At the end of August 2006 the Joint Rules Committee agreed to the establishment of an 
interim mechanism with interim rules which would determine its function. The rules would 
be drafted by the Joint Subcommittee on the Review of the Joint Rules.200 
On the 20th of June 2007 Joint Rules Committee agreed to adopt the draft resolution proposed 
by the Subcommittee for the establishment of an Interim Scrutiny Committee.201 
Masutha explained that ultimately a ‘comprehensive framework would govern delegated 
legislation’, but for the present the interim committee would scrutinise instruments that 
require action by Parliament as stipulated in the enabling act. He added that the committee 
would function as an ‘advisory body to portfolio and select committees’.202 
However, by the end of the third Parliament in 2009, the draft rules had not been completed 
and the matter was left to the fourth Parliament to take forward.203  
In December 2006 the presiding officers of Parliament initiated the Independent Panel 
Assessment of Parliament. The Panel produced a report in 2009 in which it ‘strongly’ urged 
Parliament to establish a scrutiny mechanism for delegated legislation as it ‘reflects directly 
on Parliament’s independence and the effectiveness with which it exercises its legislative 
mandate.’204 
The Panel expressed its concern that such a mechanism had not been established - calling it 
‘overdue’205 - especially considering that the mechanism had been proposed in the interim 
report of the Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation in 2002.206  
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The Panel also noted that the ‘interim’ nature of the scrutiny mechanism proposed by the 
resolution would not be sufficient and recommended that Parliament ‘develop permanent 
structures and processes as a matter of urgency.’207 
4.2.2 Interim Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation  
Finally in 2011 the National Assembly (on 22 June 2011)208 and the National Council of 
Provinces (on 20 September 2011)209 respectively passed a motion to establish an Interim 
Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation. The Committee would consist of nine 
NA members and five NCOP members.  
The Committee was tasked with scrutinising – in accordance with the criteria identified in the 
interim Rules –  
(a) delegated legislation -  
(i) requiring approval by Parliament for it to enter into force;  
(ii) which Parliament may disapprove, thus invalidating it; and  
(iii) that requires consultation with Parliament;  
(b) delegating provisions in bills before their formal consideration by the House; and  
(c) any other delegated legislation agreed upon by the Committee.210 
 
Delegated legislation was to be scrutinised according to some or all of the following criteria:  
(a) whether they impose levies, taxes or duties not authorised through a money bill 
passed in accordance with section 77 of the Constitution; 
(b) whether they comply with procedural aspects pertaining to delegated legislation; 
(c) whether they impinge on the jurisdiction of the courts; 
(d) whether they are retrospective in nature and, if so, whether that is permitted in terms 
of the parent Act;  
(e) whether they conform with the objects of the parent Act;  
(f) whether they appear to make unusual use of powers conferred by the parent Act; 
(g) whether they have been properly drafted;  
(h) whether they trespass on personal rights and liberties, including those set out in the 
Bill of Rights, in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution; or 
(i) whether they amount to substantive legislation.211 
 
Delegating provisions in bills where to be scrutinised in accordance with some or all of the 
following criteria: 
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(a) whether they impose levies, taxes or duties not authorised through a money 
bill passed in accordance with section 77 of the Constitution; 
(b) whether they impinge on the jurisdiction of the courts; or  
(c) whether they have been properly drafted.212 
 
Upon completion of the scrutiny process, the Committee was required to report its findings to 
the National Assembly for the information of the relevant portfolio or select committee and 
other members.213 
The Committee had to specifically report to the NCOP on delegated instruments dealing with 
matters contained in Schedule 4 of the Constitution.214 
Despite a motion having been passed in both houses of Parliament by September 2011, the 
Committee only met for the first time on the 2nd of May 2012 with the only order of business 
being the selection of the co-chairpersons (one from the NA and one from the NCOP).215  
In a memorandum to the members of the Committee regarding the first meeting it was 
acknowledged that all members were already serving on other committees and availability of 
members to attend meetings would therefore be a challenge.216 At the Committee’s second 
meeting in May 2012 best practices and legal requirements were discussed.217   
From August 2012 to February 2014, the Interim Committee held four meetings during which 
a number of regulations were scrutinised and deliberated on.   
In August 2012 the Committee met to consider its first set of regulations, the Housing 
Development Agency Regulations of 2011 (these had also been referred to the Committee on 
Human Settlements).218  
A senior parliamentary legal advisor briefed the Committee on the housing regulations and 
raised issue with the granting of unusual powers, certain contradictions between the draft 
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regulations and the Act, as well as some drafting mistakes. The Committee resolved to adopt 
a report indicating their concerns in respect of the draft regulations.219  
In May 2013 the Committee met to deliberate and consider regulations made in terms of  
section 19 and directives made in terms of section 20(1)(b) and section 20(3)(a) of the 
Protection from Harassment Act220.  
The Parliamentary Legal Services advised the Committee that it was of the opinion that the 
regulations and directives made in terms of the Protection from Harassment Act complied 
with the scrutiny criteria. The Committee formally adopted a report on the regulations.221 
The Committee also considered the Alien and Invasive Species Regulations made in terms of 
the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act222 and referred to it in terms of 
section 8(3) of the Act, read with section 146(6) of the Constitution.223 
The Parliamentary Legal Services also advised that after scrutiny of the delegating provision 
of the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act, it had been found that 
necessary consultative process in terms of section 99 and 100 of the aforementioned Act had 
been complied with.224  
However, section 8(3) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act read 
with section 146(6) of the Constitution only required the Minister to submit regulations for 
approval if there was a conflict between the national regulations and provincial regulations or 
a provincial act.225  
In this instance the Department had confirmed that there was no conflict and therefore there 
was no need for the regulations to be submitted for approval or disapproval. However, in 
terms of the Committee’s rule 3(2)(c), the Committee could scrutinise any regulations agreed 
upon.226 
The Committee adopted a report stating that the regulations complied with the scrutiny 
criteria and that the regulations should be referred back to the Minister of Environmental 
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Affairs given that it was no requirement for the Minister to submit the regulations for 
approval or disapproval.227 
In June 2013 the Committee met to consider amendments to the National Road Traffic 
Regulations, 2000, made in terms of the National Road Traffic Act.228  
The Legal Services Section indicated that the amendments to the National Road Traffic 
Regulations complied with the scrutiny criteria, except where it applied retrospectively. The 
National Road Traffic Act did not provide for the application of provisions with retrospective 
effect.  
The Committee adopted a report reflecting this opinion and recommended that the 
Department of Transport ‘change the dates that are retrospective in nature and make them 
prospective.’229 
On the same day the Committee also considered and deliberated on the regulations for a 
supply chain management system for Parliament, made in terms of section 65(1)(e) of the 
Financial Management of Parliament Act230. 
Section 65(6) of the Financial Management of Parliament Act required that the regulations 
issued by the executive authority may only come into effect after approval by Parliament.231  
Legal Services advised the Committee that in terms of the regulations the majority of the 
required scrutiny criteria had been complied with, except for the procedural requirements as 
set out in section 65(5) of the parent Act and that the draft regulations were inconsistent with 
the general drafting style used in legislation and regulations (in terms of style, numbering and 
format).232 
However, after further input from the parliamentary legal advisors it was decided that a report 
on the matter would be premature. The draft regulations had also been referred to the 
Standing and Select Committees on Finance in accordance with section 65(5) of the Act 
which required publication for public comment.233  
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At that time the Standing and Select Committees on Finance still had to conduct hearings and 
it was advised that the Committee wait for this process to be completed before reporting on 
the regulations. The importance of the coordination between the Interim Joint Committee and 
that of the Standing and Select Committees of Finances was highlighted.234 
The members of the Committee noted the importance of having the chairpersons of parent 
committees present during presentations involving their committees, both chairpersons had 
sent apologies for this specific meeting.235  
The Committee decided not to report until the procedural requirements of section 65(5) of the 
Act had been complied with.236  
In February 2014 the Committee met to deliberate and consider four sets of rules and 
regulations.237  
The Committee considered draft regulations made in terms of section 24(1)(a) of the Military 
Veterans Act238 on the criteria that military veterans have to meet in order to qualify for 
benefits. Section 24(3) of the Act required that regulations made in terms of 24(1)(a) had to 
be tabled in Parliament at least 30 days before the regulation is published.  
The Legal Services Section was of the opinion that the draft regulations made in terms of the 
Military Veterans Act complied with the scrutiny criteria, but that the draft regulations 
‘should be properly drafted in order to comply with drafting convention in respect of accurate 
grammar, numbering and cross referencing.’239 
The Committee adopted a report stating that the scrutiny criteria had been complied with, but 
recommended that the regulations be properly drafted.240 
The Committee then considered the Housing Development Agency draft regulations 
submitted for consultation with Parliament in terms of section 32 of the Housing 
Development Agency Act.241 
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In term of the Housing Development Agency draft regulations, the Legal Services Section 
indicated that he majority of the required scrutiny criteria had been complied with, except for 
regulation 23 which dealt with penalties and offences. The Legal Services Section stated that 
the Act did not empower the Minister to make regulations regarding offences and penalties. 
By making such a regulation the Minister would be acting ‘outside the scope and powers 
granted by the Act.’242 
Section 32 of the parent Act required that he Minister must make regulations after consulting 
with the Agency and Parliament. At the time the regulations were also before the Portfolio 
Committee on Human Settlements.243  
The Committee formally adopted a report stating that the regulations complied with the 
scrutiny criteria, ‘except for clause 23 which requires further engagement by the Portfolio 
Committee on Human Settlements.’244 
The Committee then considered the draft Credit Rating Agency Rules made in terms of 
section 24 of the Credit Rating Services Act.245 Section 24(3)(a)(ii) of this Act requires that 
before the registrar makes any rule in terms of section 24, the draft rule must be submitted to 
Parliament at least one month prior to promulgation.  
In terms of the draft rules, the Legal Services Section was of the view that all the scrutiny 
criteria had been complied with and the Committee adopted a formal report to that effect.246 
The Committee reconsidered the draft regulations on a supply chain management system for 
Parliament, which had first come before the Committee on 5 June 2013. 
Since the Committee’s first consideration of the regulations, the procedural requirements had 
been complied with and both the Select and Standing Committee on Finance had reported to 
both houses on the regulations. As all the requirements had been met, the Committee adopted 
a formal report stating that the scrutiny criteria had been complied with.247 
In the Committee’s very threadbare report on the activities undertaken during the 4th 
Parliament, it indicated no set programme existed for the Committee because of the ‘legal 
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and procedural technicalities of the functions of the Committee and that the committee is still 
“finding its functional feet”’.248 
The Committee identified key challenges which it had experienced since its inception. This 
included that it was not always possible for the Committee to meet because of the clashing 
programmes, so the finalisations of reports depended on the programme of Parliament and the 
availability of the members.249  
In terms of the constitutional mandate of the Committee, it recommended that a ‘Discussion 
Document’ be drafted to assist portfolio and select committees when they dealt with bills 
with provisions delegating law making. Lastly the Committee wanted to determine its role in 
ensuring that delegation legislation is made accessible to the public and consider methods to 
determine how to make it more accessible to the public.250   
In early 2014 Parliament closed in preparation for the national election which was held on the 
7th of May 2014.  
The fourth Parliament’s (2009 – 2014) legacy report recommended that the fifth Parliament 
consider whether to establish a permanent mechanism for the scrutiny of delegated legislation 
or whether to continue with the interim joint committee. In case of the latter, the draft 
operational guidelines proposed by the current committee would need to be considered.251  
In its report on the fourth Parliament the Parliamentary Monitoring Group referred to the 
‘very late’ establishment of the Interim Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Delegated 
Legislation.252 
The Report also referred to the difficulty that some joint and ad hoc committees had with 
scheduling meetings, but remarked that the Interim Committee on Delegate Legislation had  
…operated extremely effectively to date through ensuring that all members receive 
documents well in advance, that chairpersons of committees whose regulations are being 
discussed are present, and by the proactive stance of both chairpersons, who not only 
round up members themselves after House sittings, but ensure that the meetings are 
comprehensive yet succinct with no waste of time.253  
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Herman Groenewald, who was a member of the Interim Committee for the Democratic 
Alliance, believes that a committee of this nature could play an important role in the 
legislative process, but added that the Interim Committee had contributed ‘very little’.254  
Groenewald remembers that it was very difficult to get all the members present at meetings, 
because they had already been placed with other committees. The Committee had not been 
established at the beginning of the fourth Parliament, only much later.255  
Vincent Smith was one of the co-chairpersons of the Interim Committee for the African 
National Congress and according to him the purpose of the Committee was clear, however, 
the actual detail of the work method and work load was unknown. The Committee ‘learnt as 
we went along.’256 Smith believes the Committee should be re-established.  
4.2.3 The Fifth Parliament  
Despite the recommendations in the fourth Parliament’s legacy report, the Interim Joint 
Committee on Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation was not continued in the fifth Parliament. 
Given the unceremonious end to the Committee, after more than a decade of preparation and 
a mere 19 months of work, it is entirely appropriate and fitting to requote Baxter, as if he did 
not write these words in 1983, but in 2017:  
In South Africa, where the balance between political parties is much more one-sided, and 
where scrutiny procedures are virtually non-existent, the executive has little if anything 
to fear from Parliament – hence even the duty to lay copies of delegated legislation has 
proved too great an effort.257  
 
His words of course refer to our pre-constitutional era, characterised by a lot less openness 
and transparency, but it is clear that executive dominance of the South African Parliament has 
left little to no appetite for additional mechanisms to scrutinise the executive’s rule-making.  
A further blow to the prospects of reviving the mechanisms came when the Rules Committee 
of the National Assembly met on the 17th of April 2015 to discuss chapters 12 to 15 of the 
rules of the National Assembly.258 
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Upon the discussion of section 165 on subcommittees it was indicated that only the 
Subcommittee on Review of the Rules would remain, the others, including the Subcommittee 
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5. Scrutiny by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature  
5.1. Gauteng Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation Act  
The Gauteng Provincial Legislature is the only legislature in South Africa that has managed 
to create a permanent mechanism to oversee delegated legislation.  
The Gauteng Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation Act260 (GSSL Act) was approved by the 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature on the 4th of December 2008 and commenced on the 9th of 
February 2009.  
According to Klaaren and Sibanda, the success of the undertaking to give the legislature the 
power to scrutinise subordinate legislation can be credited to the provincial leadership’s 
sustained political support and a ‘close match between the extent of desired institutional 
innovation, on the one hand, and the everyday experience of governance on the part of both 
public servants and elected politicians, on the other’.261 
In the same year that the Act commenced, the Legislature’s Scrutiny of Subordinate 
Legislation Committee identified certain ‘gaps and defects’262 which led to the introduction 
of the Gauteng Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation Amendment Bill of 2010. 
Before the amendment, the Act mandated the tabling of subordinate legislation after its 
publication in the Provincial Gazette (when it had already taken effect). After the 
amendment, the Act mandated that subordinate legislation had to be tabled in draft form.263  
The Committee was of the opinion that tabling regulations for scrutiny post- publication, as 
was required by the original GSSL Act, ‘defeats the object of the Legislature's approval of 
subordinate legislation as envisaged by section 140(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.’264 
The amended Act now also requires that a regulation introduced by a Member of the 
Executive Council has to be accompanied by an appropriate certificate from a State Law 
Adviser.265 
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The original Act required that subordinate legislation had to be scrutinised according to three 
criteria namely, whether it: 
(a) is constitutional and, among other things, does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the 
courts or infringe rights or the rule of law;  
(b) is authorised by the act under which it was made; and  
(c) does not constitute an unfair use of the power under which it was made.266 
 
The Amendment Bill proposed replacing the section quoted above with the following: 
(a) is consistent with the Constitution; 
(b) is authorised by the Act under which it is to be made; 
(c) complies with any condition set out in that Act; and 
(d) does not constitute an unfair use of the power under which it is to be made.267 
 
It appears that the amendment bill was mainly aimed at fixing some clumsy drafting, 
however the amended Act that was eventually passed contained an additional four criteria to 
the four listed above and were most likely added during the committee deliberations (the 
entire section is listed below). 
The amendment Bill also introduced a timeframe in which the Committee is required to 
approve or disapprove the subordinate legislation, and provided for matters connected 
therewith.268   
The passage of the GSSL Act in 2008, and its subsequent amendment in 2011, stands in 
contrast with the National Assembly which only got as far a motion to set up an interim 
measure for the scrutiny of delegated legislation in 2011. No legislation has been passed to 
make this mechanism permanent.  
The Act defines subordinate legislation narrowly. It includes regulations, but excludes other 
secondary legislative instruments such as proclamations, rules, notices and determinations.269 
The GSSL Act has several mechanisms to foster executive accountability of which the core 
mechanism is the establishment of the Committee on the Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation 
(CSSL).  
The CSSL’s manual describes the Committee’s role as follows: 
Due to the volume and complexity of legislation in a modern society, the Legislature 
cannot attend to all details. It provides the policies, principles and frameworks in the 
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principal Act, and delegates the authority to fill in the administrative and technical details 
by the way of subordinate legislation to the Executive. However, constitutionally the 
Legislature remains responsible to oversee the activities of the Executive on behalf of the 
voters. This includes oversight over subordinate legislation made by the Executive.270 
 
The CSSL consist of a chairperson and seven members from the provincial legislature 
spanning differing political parties and is supported by administrative staff.271  
The GSSL Act requires that when a provincial functionary wants to make subordinate 
legislation, the functionary has to first table these regulations in the Provincial Legislature for 
scrutiny by the CSSL. 272   
The functionary responsible for the draft regulations may request the Speaker – after 
consultation with the chairperson of the CSSL – to exempt the draft regulation from the 
tabling requirement and as such the regulations will not get referred to the CSSL.273  
The MEC (or a delegate) of the responsible department then presents to the committee, either 
verbally or in writing.274  
The CSSL is tasked with scrutinising both the granting of a power in a statute to make 
subordinate legislation and the actual subordinate legislation.275  
Draft subordinate legislation is scrutinised to determine whether it -  
(a) is consistent with the Constitution; 
(b) is authorised by the Act under which it is to be made; 
(c) complies with any condition set out in the Act; and  
(d) does not constitute an unreasonable exercise of the power under which it is to be 
made; 
(e) raises or spends revenue not authorised by the Act;  
(f) is vague or ambiguous; 
(g) has retrospective effect without express authority by that Act; or  
(h) does not fulfil formal drafting requirements.276  
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The CSSL may refer the draft subordinate legislation to another committee for comment.277 If 
the CSSL finds that any provision of the draft subordinate legislation does not comply with 
the standards listed above, the CSSL must request the functionary to remedy the defect and to 
submit the amended draft to the Committee.278  
Within 21 working days from when the first draft legislation was referred to the Committee 
or from the date on which it received an amended draft, the CSSL must decide whether to 
approve or disapprove the draft subordinate legislation.279  
According to the CSSL’s manual, the Committee will not withhold approval only on the basis 
of formal shortcomings, like in the case of a drafting mistake. The Committee will also not 
disapprove of the draft regulations without consulting with the relevant Portfolio Committee 
and without referring the regulations back to the functionary for amendment.280 
The CSSL can also invite the chairperson of the relevant portfolio committee to attend a 
meeting of the CSSL. The Standing Rules allow for two committees to convene a joint 
meeting to consider a matter that might be of mutual interest – such as regulations and their 
possible impact.281   
In the case of ‘important or controversial regulations’, the CSSL can, with the help of a 
portfolio committee, schedule a public hearing to provide for public participation in the 
scrutiny of the draft regulations.282 
Where more than 21 days is needed to make a decision, the chairperson, after consultation 
with the Speaker, must inform the responsible MEC in writing of the reasons why more time 
is required and indicate the date by which the CSSL will complete the scrutiny process. It 
may not be later than 14 days after the expiry of the prescribed 21 days.283  
If the Committee does not take a decision within the prescribed period, the draft subordinate 
legislation shall be deemed to have been approved.284 
If the Committee approves draft subordinate legislation, the chairperson of the Committee 
must notify the provincial functionary in writing of the decision and ensure that a notice of 
                                                          
277 Ibid at section 4(2). 
278 Ibid at section 4(3). 
279 Ibid at section 4(5). 
280 'Manual Committee on the Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation' op sit (n270) 13.  
281 Gauteng Legislature Standing Rules (2017) at section 155. 
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the decision is published in the Legislature’s announcements, tablings, and committee 
reports.285   
The CSSL may only disapprove draft subordinate legislation if it finds that it did not comply 
with the eight criteria set out in section 4(1) of the Act as quoted above.286  
If the CSSL, for whatever reason set out in the Act and despite steps to avoid it, decides to 
disapprove the draft subordinate legislation, the Committee must report the disapproval to the 
House for consideration and decision.287  
In the case of approval of the draft regulations by the CSSL or the House, the functionary 
may go ahead and make the regulations and the responsible Department must publish the 
regulations in the Gazette within 14 days.288 
The Act also requires that the Office of the Premier compile, maintain, and publish an up-to-
date and accessible index of all provincial subordinate legislation.289 The index must be made 
available regularly by electronic means and be published at least once a year in the Provincial 
Gazette.290   
Klaaren and Sibanda are of the view that the requirement mentioned above promotes the 
same goals of ‘executive accountability and broadened democracy as the tabling and approval 
provisions.’291  
The indexing requirement resembles the provisions proposed by the draft Administrative 
Justice Bill which never made it into Parliament’s version of the Bill or the eventual 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.292  
5.2 Standing Rules of the Gauteng Legislature  
The Gauteng Legislature’s Standing Rules also contain provisions governing subordinate 
legislation.  
It requires that the Committee for the Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation scrutinise and 
review all subordinate legislation, but also review every provincial bill granting power to a 
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provincial executive or any other body to adopt subordinate legislation. 293 The latter 
requirement is not covered by the GSSL Act.  
Every bill that gives the executive or another body the power to adopt subordinate legislation 
must be referred to the CSSL.294 When reviewing these bills, the CSSL must ensure that the 
grant of power has ‘clear parameters and is not unduly general or without clear directions to 
the subordinate law-making authority’ and does not authorise the making of unconstitutional 
subordinate legislation.295 
If the CSSL considers that a grant of power to adopt subordinate legislation does not meet the 
requirements in rule 235(2), the CSSL must consult with the relevant portfolio committee and 
make recommendations on how to correct the problem.296 A report of the CSSL on the 
relevant bill with the relevant portfolio committee report must be tabled in the House. 297 
It is unclear why the latest Standing Rules contain provisions covered by the GSSL Act, 
especially since the scrutiny criteria in the Act and in the Rules do not match.   
The Standing Rules also state that ‘[a]ll Subordinate Legislation made in terms of a National 
or Provincial Act must be submitted to the Legislature by the person who made it.’298  
This could indicate that the provisions on the scrutiny of subordinate legislation in the 
Standing Rules date from before the amendments to the GSSL Act requiring the tabling of 
draft subordinate legislation and have just never been revised. This is also reflected by 
sections 239 and 240 of the standing rules relating to the powers of the committee and the 
invalidation of subordinate legislation. 
The review criteria for subordinate legislation listed in the Standing Rules differ from those 
listed in the GSSL Act as amended, with some level of overlap. However, various sections 
the Committee’s manual stipulates that the CSSL must scrutinise draft regulations in terms of 
the criteria stipulated in the GSSL Act.299  
The Standing Rules require that when the CSSL reviews subordinate legislation, it must 
ensure that the legislation is constitutional, does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the 
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courts or infringe rights or the rule of law; and is authorised by the act under which it was 
made.300  
In fulfilling its function as described above, the CSSL must consider that the subordinate 
legislation:  
a) is authorised by the terms of the enabling Act and complies with any condition set out 
in the Act; 
b) is in conformity with the Bill of Rights; and does not: 
(i) have a retrospective effect without express authority having been provided for in 
the enabling legislation; 
(ii) impose a tax, levy or duty or requires spending by the Province without express 
authority having been provided for this in the enabling Act; 
(iii) impose a fine, imprisonment or other penalty without express authority having 
been provided for this in the enabling Act;  
(iv) tend directly or indirectly to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts; 
(v) appear for any reason to infringe the rule of law; 
(vi) make the rights of the person unduly dependent on administrative discretion or is 
not consistent with the rules of natural justice; 
(vii) contain matter more appropriate for enactment by the Legislature; and 
(viii) is not defective in it’s [sic] drafting or requires explanation as to it’s [sic] form or 
purport.301 
 
5.3 The Work of the Committee 
The table below indicates the number of bills and regulations considered by the CSSL in each 
financial year since its work began. 
Financial Year Number of Bills Number of Instruments 
2011/2012 Not available Not available 
2012/2013 1 8 
2013/2014 2 2 
2014/2015 1 5 
2015/2016 0 4 
2016/2017 1 7 
 
                                                          
300 GL Standing Rules at section 238(3). 
301 Ibid at section 238(5).  
53 
 
The CSSL produces quarterly reports and annual reports setting out the Committee's 
activities in that year; the overall socio-economic impact of the legislation scrutinised; the 
overall analysis of legal compliance of regulations; the overall performance of the 
Committee; the way forward; and recommendations.  
The Committee’s reports for the financial years 2012/2013, 2013/14, 2014/2015, 2015/16 and 
2016/2017 indicate that the Committee ‘observed and commended a general compliance by 
Departments with procedures and processes of the committee.’ In all those years the 
Committee also found that the regulations introduced in the specific year under review ‘were 
essentially in line with the requirements’ as set out in the Constitution, the GSSL Act and the 
Gauteng Provincial Standing Rules.302  
In the 2012/13 financial year the CSSL held eight Committee meetings, adopted eleven 
Committee Reports, and drew attention to the matters. 
The Committee could not scrutinise one set of regulations, the Gauteng Petition Regulations, 
2013, after raising concerns about the drafting process and how the regulations interrelated or 
connected with the Gauteng Petitions Act. The Committee advised the Proceedings Unit to 
follow the GSSL Act, especially with regards to following due process in terms of public 
engagement for comments.303 It was proposed that the Gauteng Petitions Regulations be 
redrafted.  
In the same year, the Department of Health, through the MEC, tabled three sets of regulations 
which were exempted from normal scrutiny in the interest of ‘service delivery’. The 
Committee ‘accepted the mitigating circumstances’.304 
The Committee further identified certain problem areas in regulations which would require 
departments’ attention during the implementation phase and these observations were referred 
to the relevant portfolio committees ‘for further monitoring’. 305   
In 2013/14 the CSSL held seven Committee meetings and two joint committee meetings with 
the Portfolio on Economic Development, adopted 14 committee reports and had a joint public 
hearing with the Portfolio Committee on Economic Development on the draft Gauteng 
Liquor Bill, 2013.  
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In 2014/15 the Committee held eight Committee meetings, one joint committee meeting with 
the Portfolio Committee on Sport, Recreation and Arts and Culture and adopted 14 
committee reports.  
In 2015/16 the Committee held five committee meetings and adopted 14 committee reports.  
In 2016/17 the Committee held nine committee meetings and one joint meeting with the 
Committee on Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, one strategic planning review session and 
adopted 14 committee reports.  
When comparing each of the Committee’s annual reports, it appears that the Committee’s 
stated findings and recommendations are quite repetitive. This could indicate that certain 
issues will always plague the work of a Committee of this nature or that the Committee is 
often let down by external factors or that the Committee is failing to address certain persistent 
issues.   
In every report for the financial years 2012/2013, 2013/14, 2014/2015 and 2015/16 the CSSL 
observed that to further strengthen the Committee’s processes, it would need to develop 
procedural guidelines on the ‘internal process of engaging with Regulations from tabling to 
approval.’306 
Similarly, when the CSSL looks to the future or makes recommendations, many issues 
consistently reappear, namely: 
 Increased capacity building for members and staff (2012/13, 2013/14, 2014/15); 
 Popularising the work of the Committee and creating focused awareness campaigns 
on the work of the CSSL (2012/2013, 2013/2014, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17);  
 Improving the integrated working relationship with other portfolio committees 
(2012/2013, 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/2017); 
 That departments must table draft regulations to the legislature timeously in order to 
allow sufficient time for processing (2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17); and 
 Public participation on draft regulations require further strengthening by the 
departments (2012/13, 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17). 
The Committee’s annual reports also include a section on the socio-economic impact of 
regulations on the people of Gauteng.  
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For instance in both 2012/13 and 2013/14 the Committee recommended that public 
participation on draft regulations required further strengthening because this would ‘assist in 
curbing the negative socio-economic impact on the people of Gauteng.’307 In both 2013/14 
and 2014/2015 the Committee found that the ‘provision that grants power to MEC to make 
regulations within the Bills scrutinised by the Committee did not have any direct or indirect 
negative socio-economic impact on the citizens of Gauteng.’308  
The Committee’s decision to comment on the socio-economic impact of the subordinate 
regulations is interesting, considering that it is not listed as one of the scrutiny criteria in the 
GSSL Act.  
However, the Standing Rules do require that every report of a committee must ‘[e]xplain the 
implications of the matter under consideration for promoting the rights in the Bill of Rights 
and particularly, gender, equity, and socioeconomic rights.’309 
For the sake of clarity the Legislature should look towards amending its rules so that there is 
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6. Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in Foreign Legislatures  
In order to document the South African Parliament’s progress in overseeing delegated 
legislation, it is helpful to investigate the mechanisms designed and implemented by other 
legislatures around the world.  
This chapter will discuss how the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Kenya, Zambia, 
Tanzania, and Ghana – countries with a Westminster style government - have implemented 
oversight mechanisms and will briefly examine the situation in Germany.    
6.1 United Kingdom 
The British Parliament – which has been model for many other national legislatures - consists 
of two houses, the House of Lords (the upper house) and the House of Commons (the lower 
house). The House of Lords is comprised of 800 members appointed by the Queen on the 
advice of the prime minister, and it is subordinate to the House of Commons which is 
comprised of an elected 650 members.  
Delegated legislation in the United Kingdom is governed by the Statutory Instruments Act of 
1946.  
An act granting a functionary the power to make a statutory instrument may require that the 
instrument be made subject to a negative resolution procedure. This means that the 
instrument will become law unless there is an objection by one of the two houses of 
Parliament within 40 days (through a motion calling for annulment).310 Instruments subject to 
negative resolution ‘are few are far between’.311 
An act may also make an instrument subject the affirmative resolution procedure. The 
instrument is then tabled in draft form, but cannot become law unless the draft is approved by 
both houses (or in the case of instruments dealing with financial statutory instruments, only 
the House of Commons).312 
An act can also require that an instrument must merely be tabled in Parliament without 
undergoing parliamentary scrutiny or it can stipulate that tabling is not necessary at all.313  
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The committees created by each house of Parliament to scrutinise statutory instruments is 
discussed below.  
Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (JCSI) 
The Committee is comprised of seven members of the House of Commons, seven members 
of the House of Lords and chaired by a member of the House of Commons. The Committee 
considers whether the relevant functionary’s powers are being carried out in accordance with 
the enabling act and does not consider the merit or underlying policy of the instrument.314 
The JCSI can take oral and written evidence, but only from the government department 
responsible for the statutory instrument.315  
The JCSI is tasked with considering statutory instruments made in exercise of powers granted 
by an act of Parliament (there are some exclusions) to determine whether the special attention 
of the House should be drawn to the instrument on any of the following grounds:  
(i) that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains provisions requiring 
payments to be made to the Exchequer or any government department or to any 
local or public authority in consideration of any licence or consent or of any 
services to be rendered, or prescribes the amount of any such charge or payment; 
(ii) that it is made in pursuance of any enactment containing specific provisions 
excluding it from challenge in the courts, either at all times or after the expiration 
of a specific period; 
(iii) that it purports to have retrospective effect where the parent statute confers no 
express authority so to provide; 
(iv) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the publication or in the 
laying of it before Parliament; 
(v) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in sending a notification under 
the proviso to section 4(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, where an 
instrument has come into operation before it has been laid before Parliament; 
(vi) that there appears to be a doubt whether it is intra vires or that it appears to make 
some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the statute under 
which it is made; 
(vii) that for any special reason its form or purport calls for elucidation; 
(viii) that its drafting appears to be defective; 
 
or on any other ground which does not impinge on its merits or on the policy 
behind it; and to report its decision with the reasons thereof in any particular 
case.316  
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The Committee (or any of its sub-committees) has the power to require any applicable 
government department to submit a memorandum explaining any instruments or to depute a 
representative to appear before it to explain the instrument.317  
House of Commons - Select Committee on Statutory Instruments 
This Committee considers instruments made in exercise of an Act which are only subject to 
House of Commons scrutiny. 
House of Commons – Delegated Legislation Committees  
Whereas the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Commons Select Committee 
on Statutory Instruments scrutinises technical aspects of delegated legislation, these 
committees discuss the merits of a particular instrument.318 
Debates on statutory instruments are conducted in meetings of several ad hoc Delegated 
Legislation Committees comprised of 16 to 18 members each.319  
House of Lords: Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (SLSC) 
This Committee was established in 2003 as the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, 
but was renamed in 2012 to reflect the widening of its responsibilities.  
The Committee is tasked with scrutinising (with certain exceptions) every instrument 
(whether statutory instrument or not) or draft of an instrument and every proposal which is in 
the form of a draft of such an instrument and which has been laid before each House of 
Parliament under an act of Parliament, with a view to determine whether or not the special 
attention of the House should be drawn to it320 on any of the following grounds:  
(a) that it is politically or legally important or gives rise to issues of public policy likely 
to be of interest to the House; 
(b) that it may be inappropriate in view of changed circumstances since the enactment of 
the parent Act; 
(c) that it may inappropriately implement European Union legislation; 
(d) that it may imperfectly achieve its policy objectives; 
(e) that the explanatory material laid in support provides insufficient information to gain 
a clear understanding about the instrument’s policy objective and intended 
implementation; 
(f) that there appear to be inadequacies in the consultation process which relates to the 
instrument.321  
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The Committee must also consider general matters that relate to the effective scrutiny of 
secondary legislation and which arise from the performance of its functions, except matters 
within the order of reference of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.322  
House of Lords: Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
The role of this Committee is to consider whether the provisions of any bill inappropriately 
delegate legislative power or whether it is subject to an inappropriate level of parliamentary 
scrutiny.323  
Strathclyde Review 
In October 2015 the UK Government commissioned Lord Strathclyde to lead a review into 
secondary legislation and the primacy of the House of Commons. This followed the defeat of 
the Conservative government’s draft Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of 
Rates) (Amendment) Regulations of 2015 in the House of Lords.  
The mandate of the Strathclyde Review was to consider ‘how more certainty and clarity 
could be brought to the passage [of statutory instruments] through Parliament’.  
Lord Strathclyde published his report in December 2015 and the report suggested three 
options which might ‘provide the House of Commons with a decisive role on statutory 
instruments’. 324 
The first suggestion was to remove the House of Lords from statutory instrument procedure 
altogether, but said the report ‘it would be controversial and would weaken parliamentary 
scrutiny of delegated legislation and could make the passage of some primary legislation 
more difficult.’ 
The second suggestion would retain the present role of the House of Lords with regards to 
statutory instruments, but would require that the restrictions on the exercise of its powers be 
clarified in a resolution.   
The third suggestion was to create a new procedure set out in statute, whereby the Lords 
would invite the Commons to ‘think again when a disagreement exists and insist on its 
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primacy.’ The Review preferred the third option which would bring it more in line with how 
the House of Commons currently interacts with primary legislation.  
The Report stated that the convention that the House of Lords reject statutory instruments ‘is 
longstanding but has been interpreted in different ways, has not been understood by all, and 
has never been accepted by some members of the House.’ This suggested that the convention 
‘is now so flexible that it is barely a convention at all.’325 
The House of Lords responded in a special report by concluded that ‘further work should be 
carried out by the two Houses working together, most appropriately as a Joint Committee, to 
consider the scrutiny of delegated legislation by Parliament as a whole.’326 
Although South Africa does not have a structure that is comparable to the House of Lords, 
the Strathclyde Review serves to illustrate the tension that can arise between the executive 
and the legislature over the passage of delegated legislation. It is perhaps better for scrutiny 
committees to avoid confrontation and instead seek compromise. 
6.2 Australia  
The Australian Parliament – consisting of the House Representatives and the Senate – is 
frequently studied as a model for parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. 
Australia’s oversight of delegated legislation dates back to the1904 Interpretation Act, which 
required the tabling of all regulations before the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
Any member of either House could move for disallowance. If the motion was passed in either 
House, the regulation would be repealed. 
Currently, the Australian Parliament’s oversight of delegated legislation is governed by the 
Legislation Act of 2003327 (a 2016 version of a renamed and expanded Instruments Act of 
2003). 
For the purposes of this study it is worth highlighting four aspects of this Act.  
Firstly, the Act requires that a rule-maker for a legislative instrument or a notifiable 
instrument must lodge the instrument for registration as a notifiable instrument as soon as 
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practicable after it is made.328 Unless an instrument is registered as a legislative instrument, it 
is not enforceable by or against any person.329 
Secondly, the Act encourages high standards in the drafting of legislative and notifiable 
instruments by requiring the First Parliamentary Counsel to ‘cause steps to be taken to 
promote the legal effectiveness, clarity, and intelligibility to anticipated users, of legislative 
instruments and notifiable instruments.’330 This may include, but is not limited to, 
undertaking or supervising the drafting of these instruments, scrutinising preliminary drafts of 
these instruments, providing advice with regards to drafting, providing training in drafting, 
seconding staff to departments or other agencies, or providing drafting precedents.331 
Thirdly, within six days after the registration of the instrument, the Office of Parliamentary 
Counsel332 must arrange for a copy of each registered legislative instrument to be laid before 
each House of Parliament.333 
If the above is not done, the legislative instrument ceases to have effect immediately after the 
last of the six day time period.334 
Either House may then disallow the legislation instrument or a provision within a certain time 
after the instrument’s tabling.335  
Finally, a legislative instrument is automatically repealed after the tenth anniversary of its 
registration, with provisions for certain exceptions.336 This practice is also commonly known 
as ‘sunsetting’. 
After being tabled in Parliament, the instruments are referred to the Senate’s Standing 
Committee on Regulations and Ordinances for scrutiny.337  
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The Committee consists of six members, three members of the government party in the 
Senate and three who are not members of the government party.338 The chair of the 
Committee is required to be one of the members belonging to the government party.339 
Delegated legislation is scrutinised according to the following criteria:  
 that it is in accordance with the statute; 
 that it does not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
 that it does not unduly make the rights and liberties of citizens dependent upon 
administrative decisions which are not subject to review of their merits by a judicial 
or other independent tribunal; and 
 that it does not contain matter more appropriate for parliamentary enactment.340 
 
After scrutiny, if the Committee is concerned about an instrument it is practice to require the 
responsible minister to explain or provide more information or to seek an undertaking that the 
Committee’s concern will be addressed.341   
The Committee meets in each sitting week of the Senate and seeks to conclude any matters 
within the period that the instrument may be disallowed.342  
The outcome of the Committee’s meetings are published in the Delegated Legislation 
Monitor and its Disallowance Alert webpage lists all instruments subject to a notice of 
motion for disallowance and the progress and outcome of any such notice.343  
Another Senate committee, the Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, is tasked with 
reporting whether bills or acts ‘inappropriately delegate legislative powers’ (amongst other 
things).344  
6.3 Canada  
The Canadian Parliament has two houses, an upper house, the Senate (105 members, 
appointed), and a lower house, the House of Commons (338 members, elected).  
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The Canadian Parliament’s Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations has 
existed since the early 1970s and its mandate is to review and scrutinise statutory 
instruments. 345 
The Statutory Instruments Act346 provides that every statutory instrument issued, made or 
established after the 31st of December 1971, can be referred to Parliament for reviewing and 
scrutiny.347 The Committee is also empowered by the Standing Orders of the House of 
Commons and the Rules of the Senate.  
The Chair of the Committee is a member of the governing party, the first vice-chair a 
member of the official opposition, and the second vice-chair a member of the opposition 
party other than the official opposition party.348 
Since 1979, at the beginning of each session, the House and the Senate has renewed a 
permanent reference authorising the Committee: 
to study the means by which Parliament can better oversee the government regulatory 
process and in particular to enquire into and report upon: 
1. the appropriate principles and practices to be observed 
(a) in the drafting of powers enabling delegates of Parliament to make subordinate 
laws; 
(b) in the enactment of statutory instruments; 
(c) in the use of executive regulation — including delegated powers and subordinate 
laws; 
and the manner in which Parliamentary control should be effected in respect of the same 
2. the role, functions and powers of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of 
Regulations. 349 
 
In addition, at the beginning of each parliamentary session, both houses also approve the 
Committee’s proposed review and scrutiny criteria. The following is from the 2016 report:  
Whether any regulation or other statutory instrument within its terms of reference, in the 
judgment of the committee:  
1) is not authorised by the terms of the enabling legislation or has not complied with any 
condition set forth in the legislation;  
2) is not in conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the 
Canadian Bill of Rights;  
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3) purports to have retroactive effect without express authority having been provided for 
in the enabling legislation;  
4) imposes a charge on the public revenues or requires payment to be made to the Crown 
or to any other authority, or prescribes the amount of any such charge or payment, 
without express authority having been provided for in the enabling legislation;  
5) imposes a fine, imprisonment or other penalty without express authority having been 
provided for in the enabling legislation; 
6) tends directly or indirectly to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts without express 
authority having been provided for in the enabling legislation; 
7) has not complied with the Statutory Instruments Act with respect to transmission, 
registration or publication;  
8) appears for any reason to infringe the rule of law; 
9) trespasses unduly on rights and liberties; 
10) makes the rights and liberties of the person unduly dependent on administrative 
discretion or is not consistent with the rules of natural justice;  
11) makes some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the enabling 
legislation;  
12) amounts to the exercise of a substantive legislative power properly the subject of 
direct parliamentary enactment; or  
13) is defective in its drafting or for any other reason requires elucidation as to its form 
or purport.350 
 
Regulations are initially reviewed by the Committee’s legal advisors and non-conforming 
instruments are brought to the attention of the Committee.351  
If the Committee finds problem with the regulations, it will first attempt to resolve it with the 
ministry or agency responsible for the regulation. Only when this does not produce a 
satisfactory solution, will the Committee recommend disallowance in its report.352 Both the 
Senate and the House of Commons must agree to a disallowance resolution.353  
The Joint Committee can introduce a report to the Senate and the House of Commons 
containing a resolution that a regulation or part of a regulation be revoked (an advanced 
notice of 30 days to the regulation-making authority is required).354 
The Committee’s report is deemed adopted by the Senate or the House of Commons after 15 
sitting days, unless a minister files a motion that the resolution should not be adopted, which 
means the House will debate the resolution.355  
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When both houses adopt or are deemed to have adopted the resolution that all or a portion of 
a regulation be revoked, the regulation-making authority is required to revoke the regulation 
(or part thereof) within 30 days or on a later date stipulated in the resolution.356  
6.4 Kenya  
The Parliament of Kenya consists of the Senate (upper house) and the National Assembly 
(lower house). 
Kenya’s Statutory Instruments Act357 requires that a copy of a statutory instrument shall, 
seven sitting days after its publication, be transmitted to the clerk for tabling in Parliament.358  
Every statutory instrument issued, made, or established after the Act commenced, stands 
referred to the parliamentary committee established to review and scrutinise statutory 
instruments. The committee may also scrutinise statutory instruments which were published 
before the Act commenced.359 
The Act further requires that the Committee, when scrutinising a statutory instrument or 
published bill, must be guided by ‘the principles of good governance, rule of law’ and the 
Committee must consider whether the statutory instrument— 
a) is in accord with the provisions of the Constitution, the Act pursuant to which 
it is made or other written law; 
b) infringes on fundamental rights and freedoms of the public; 
c) contains a matter which in the opinion of the Committee should more properly 
be dealt with in an Act of Parliament; 
d) contains imposition of taxation; 
e) directly or indirectly bars the jurisdiction of the Courts; 
f) gives retrospective effect to any of the provisions in respect of which the 
Constitution or the Act does not expressly give any such power; 
g) involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund or other public revenues; 
h) is defective in its drafting or for any reason the form or purport of the statutory 
instrument calls for any elucidation; 
i) appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by 
the Constitution or the Act pursuant to which it is made; 
j) appears to have had unjustifiable delay in its publication or laying before 
Parliament; 
k) makes rights liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon non-reviewable 
decisions; 
l) makes rights liberties or obligations unduly dependent insufficiently defined 
administrative powers; 
m)  inappropriately delegates legislative powers; 
                                                          
356 Ibid at section 19.1(9).  
357 23 of 2013. 
358 Ibid at section 11. 
359 Ibid at section 12. 
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n) imposes a fine, imprisonment or other penalty without express authority 
having been provided for in the enabling legislation; 
o) appears for any reason to infringe on the rule of law; 
p) inadequately subjects the exercise of legislative power to parliamentary 
scrutiny; and 
q) accords to any other reason that the Committee considers fit to examine.360 
 
The Committee may exempt certain instruments or a class of statutory instruments from 
scrutiny, if the Committee ‘is satisfied that the scrutiny is not reasonably practical due to the 
number of regulations in that class.’361  
If the Committee deems that the statutory instrument does not meet the relevant 
considerations, the Committee should report to Parliament a resolution that the statutory 
instrument be revoked.362 The report must identify which section of the statutory instrument 
warranted the report, indicate in what matter it offends the scrutiny criteria, and include its 
recommendations.363  
If the Committee does not make the report within 28 days after the date of the referral (or by 
whatever period the House may, by resolution, approve) the instrument shall be deemed to 
have met the considerations.364 
Before tabling such a report and where practical, the Committee must confer with the 
regulation-making authority about the statutory instrument ‘for their information and 
modification where necessary’.365  
The statutory instrument shall be deemed to be annulled if Parliament passes a resolution to 
that effect following the tabling of the report on it.366 
The sections of the Statutory Instruments Act discussed above are largely mirrored in section 
210 and 211 of the Standing Orders of the Kenyan Parliament367 and sections 214 and 215 of 
the Standing Orders of the Kenyan Senate.368 
                                                          
360 Ibid at section 13.  
361 Ibid at section 14. 
362 Ibid at section 15. 
363 Ibid at section 17. 
364 Ibid at section 15(2). 
365 Ibid at section 16. 
366 Ibid at section 18. 
367 Parliament of Kenya Standing Orders (2013). 




Zambia has a unicameral legislative body, the National Assembly. 
The Zambian Constitution states that despite it vesting the legislative authority of the 
Republic in Parliament,369 this ‘shall not prevent Parliament from conferring on a person or 
authority power to make statutory instruments’.370  
It also requires that a statutory instrument must be published in the Gazette no later than 28 
days after it is made.371  
The Interpretation and General Provisions Act (Cap 2) of the Laws of Zambia requires that 
all rules, regulations, and by-laws be tabled in the National Assembly as soon as possible 
after they are made.372 
If the National Assembly, within 21 days after it was tabled, decides to pass a resolution to 
annul the instrument, the instrument is void, but it does not prejudice the validity of action 
taken thereunder. 
The National Assembly’s Standing Orders establishes the Committee on Delegated 
Legislation.373 When members are appointed to the Committee, preference is given to those 
who have legal background and experience.374  
The Committee scrutinises subsidiary legislation after it has taken effect and checks that 
instruments must: 
(a) be in accordance with the Constitution or statute under which they are made; 
(b) not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
(c) not make the rights and liberties of citizens depend upon administrative decisions; and 
(d) be concerned only with administrative detail and not amount to substantive legislation 
which is a matter for parliamentary enactment.375 
 
If considered necessary by the Committee, it may invite stakeholders which the statutory 
instrument will likely impact to interact with the Committee.376  
                                                          
369 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia at section 62 and 63. 
370 Ibid at section 67(1). 
371 Ibid at section 67(2). 
372 Interpretation and General Provisions Act (Cap 2) at section 22(1). 
373 Zambia Standing Orders of the National Assembly (2016) at section 154.  
374 Ibid at section 154(2).  
375 Ibid at section 154(3). 
376 Republic of Kenya Parliament ‘The Sessional Committee on Delegated Legislation, A Report on the Study 
Visit to Zambia on 4th to 10th May, 2014’ (2014). 
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If the Committee is of the opinion that the whole or part of a statutory instrument should be 
revoked or that it should be amended in any other way, it reports its opinion and the grounds 
thereof to the House. The consideration of the report is through a motion in the National 
Assembly, which, if carried, becomes a decision of the House.  
Following the decision, the executive is required to take appropriate action on the 
recommendations and table an Action Taken Report on the recommendations within sixty 
days from the date of the adoption of the House’s report.377  
6.6 Tanzania 
Similar to the Zambian Constitution, the United Republic of Tanzania’s Constitution contains 
a provision which specifically states that the legislative powers provided to parliament by the 
constitution does not preclude it from enacting laws making provisions which confer on any 
person or department of government the power to make regulations having the force of 
law.378 
Section 35 to 43 of Tanzania’s Interpretation of the Laws Act379 deals extensively with how 
subsidiary legislation may be made and matters incidental thereto - that is should not be 
inconsistent with the written law under which it is made, that it should be published in the 
Gazette and so forth.380  
Section 38(1) also requires that all regulations must be tabled in the National Assembly 
within six sitting days of the next sitting following the publication of the regulations in the 
Gazette.381 
The National Assembly can pass – notwithstanding any provision in any other act to the 
contrary – a resolution disallowing any regulations within 14 sitting days after the regulations 
have been tabled. If the regulations are not tabled in the National Assembly in accordance 
with section 38(1), the regulations will cease to have effect. In 2007 the Tanzanian 
Parliament established by standing order, the Subsidiary Legislation Committee to scrutinise 
delegated legislation.382 
                                                          
377 Republic of Zambia ‘Report of the Committee on Delegated Legislation for the First Session of the Twelfth 
National Assembly’ (2016).  
378 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania [CAP 2 R.E. 2002] at 97(5). 
379 Cap. 1, R.E. 2002. 
380 Interpretation of the Laws Act [CAP 1 R. E.2002]. 
381 Ibid at section 38(1).  
382 Parliamentary Standing Orders No. 115 sub-order 1 and annexure 8 (1) (d). 
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6.7 Ghana  
Ghana’s Parliament created the Committee on Subsidiary Legislation.383 The Committee 
consists of no more than 25 members and is chaired by a member of the minority party (the 
only committee in parliament with this arrangement).384 
The Standing Orders require that any orders, rules, or regulations made in pursuance of the 
Constitution or the legislative functions delegated by Parliament to a subordinate authority, 
shall be tabled in Parliament and referred to the Committee by the Speaker.385  
After the subordinate instrument is referred to the committee, it is tasked with considering: 
a) whether it is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution or that Act pursuant 
to which it is made; 
b) whether it contains any matter which in the opinion of the Committee should more 
properly be dealt with in an Act of Parliament; 
c) whether it contains imposition of any tax; 
d) whether it directly or indirectly bars the jurisdiction of the courts; 
e) whether it gives retrospective effect to any of the provisions in respect of which the 
Constitution or the Act does not expressly give any such power; 
f) whether it involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund or public revenues; 
g) whether it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred 
by the Constitution or that Act pursuant to which it is made; 
h) whether there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in its publication or in laying it 
before Parliament; 
i) whether for any reason its form or purport calls for any elucidation.386 
 
If the Committee is of the opinion that an instrument should be annulled, it will report so and 
the grounds for the opinion to the House. It may also report to the House any other matter 
relating to the instrument.387  
The executive also provides the Committee with evidence of stakeholder consultation, so that 
the Committee can satisfy itself that there was ‘robust stakeholder engagement’ before the 
proposed regulations were made.388 
                                                          
383 Parliament of Ghana, Standing Orders at section 163. 
384 Ibid at section 163. 
385 Ibid at section 163.  
386 Ibid at section 163.  
387 Ibid at section 164(1) & (2). 
388 Gauteng Committee on the Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation ‘Draft Report on the Committee on the 
Scrutiny of Subordinate Legislation Study Tour to Ghana, Accra and Western Australia, Perth’ (2016). 
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The executive, if it decides to withdraw a regulation after it had been tabled, can do so on the 
floor of the House with the permission of the Speaker.389 
6.8 Germany  
The Federal Republic of Germany has two houses of parliament, the Bundesrat (upper house) 
and the Bundestag (lower house). 
The Bundesrat’s 69 representatives are nominated by the governments of the 16 Länder 
(states), while the Bundestag, the national legislative assembly, has 662 elected members.  
Article 80 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), Germany’s Constitution, deals with the issuance 
of statutory instruments. It states that a law may authorise the federal government, a federal 
minister or the land governments to issue statutory instruments. The law must specify the 
content, purpose and scope of the authority conferred and the statutory instrument shall 
contain a statement of its legal basis.390 
Unless a federal law provides otherwise, the consent of the Bundesrat shall be required for 
statutory instruments: 
…issued by the Federal Government or a Federal Minister regarding fees or basic 
principles for the use of postal and telecommunication facilities, basic principles for 
levying of charges for the use of facilities of federal railways, or the construction and 
operation of railways, as well as for statutory instruments issued pursuant to federal laws 
that require the consent of the Bundesrat or that are executed by the Länder on federal 
commission or in their own right.391 
6.9 Comparison  
There are several observations to be made about the practice of scrutinising delegated 
legislation from the examples discussed above.  
Where some countries require that instruments have to be tabled after taking effect, others 
require instruments to be laid in draft form. In the UK it depends on the parent act. 
                                                          
389 Ibid.  
390 Grundgesetz at section 80(1). 
391 Ibid at ssection 80(2). 
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Instruments are either subject to an affirmative resolution procedure, a negative resolution 
procedure, or none at all. The procedure is determined by a general statute on delegated 
legislation or in each enabling act.  
In some countries all instruments issued after a certain date can be scrutinised at any time, not 
only those tabled in the legislature at a particular point in time.  
With regards to the criteria against which delegated legislation is scrutinised, the majority of 
countries examine the technical aspects of delegated legislation. In the UK there are separate 
committees, one to examine the technical aspects of delegated legislation and one to debate 
the merit or underlying policy of the delegated legislation.  
The composition of scrutiny committees indicates that this process is largely intended to be of 
a bi-partisan nature. This is achieved by splitting the seats of the committee between the 
governing party and opposition parties, as well as awarding the chairmanship or vice-
chairmanship to someone from an opposition party.  
In many cases before an instrument can be disallowed, legislatures require that there be some 
kind of engagement with the functionary who made the instrument, usually with a view to try 
and resolve the conflict or concern. This is surely intended to reduce confrontation between 











7. Accessibility of Delegated Legislation 
As discussed in chapter two, section 101(3) of the Constitution requires that subordinate 
legislation must be accessible to the public.392 To what extent we should interpret ‘accessible 
to the public’ as required in this section is not clear. The ordinary meaning of the word 
accessible is ‘able to be reached or easily got’.393 
The South Africa Constitution Court has pronounced that the ‘need for accessibility, 
precision, and general application flow from the concept of the rule of law. A person should 
be able to know of the law, and be able to conform his or her conduct to the law’.394 
Delegated legislation becomes law after it is promulgated by publication in the Government 
Gazette. 395  
According to the National Library’s Official Publications Depository Manual ‘[c]itizens are 
expected to keep up to date with all legislation published in the Government Gazette, and 
ignorance is not permitted as a defence for violating a law or regulation.’396 
An index to the Government Gazette is printed once a year, but it does not indicate subject 
matter and therefore it is very time-consuming to find what one is looking for.397 A 
University of Pretoria guide to finding legislation states that everyday use of the Government 
Gazette is not preferable as ‘the material is very scattered and may be difficult to find.’398 
The website of the publisher of the Government Gazette, Government Printing Works, stores 
digital copies of national gazettes from 2012 onwards.399 Physical copies of the Government 
Gazette can be found at official publication depositories (usually libraries). Ironically, a list 
of where the publication depositories are is published in the Government Gazette.  
At present neither the publisher of the Government Gazette nor a government entity provides 
a register or index of all delegated legislation, per subject or per the act in terms of which it 
was made. 400 
                                                          
392 Section 140(3) of the Constitution repeats these provisions for the provincial executives. 
393 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus Cambridge University Press 
394 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at para 102. 
395 Du Bois Wille's Principles of South African Law 9th ed at 47. 
396 National Library of South Africa ‘Official Publications Depository Manual’ (August 2007) at 16. 
397 O’Regan op cit (n56) at 170. 
398 Gilmore (ed) 'PULP Guide: Finding legal information in South Africa - Third edition’ (2014) at 30. 
399 Accessible at: http://www.gpwonline.co.za/Gazettes/Pages/default.aspx 
400 Burger A Guide to Legislative Drafting in South Africa (2002). 
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Some institutions have attempted to fill the void. The University of Pretoria runs a website401 
where one can access regulations to acts for free (amongst other legal resources). However, 
the database is not comprehensive. 
Another initiative is the ambitious, yet incomplete, OpenGazettes database. Driven by the 
non-profit operation OpenUp and the South African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII), 
with support from other organisations, it aims to create a ‘fully free, fully searchable, 
collection of gazettes online’. The website currently hosts close to 30 000 Gazettes dating 
from 1958 to 2017 and currently lets you search across 11 collections of South African 
gazettes. 402 
Commercial services like Jutastat, LexisNexis Butterworths and Sabinet supply the full text 
of regulations with the acts under which they were made, however, one has to pay a fee to 
access these resources. Printed resources like Butterworth Statutes and the Juta Statutes 
contain references to the regulations passed, but do not supply the full text of these 
regulations.  
The term ‘accessible’ used in this context in the Constitution, could surely not have meant 
relying on a costly subscription to a private commercial publisher. Under these 
circumstances, expecting that people should be assumed to know the law is, as O’Regan 
rightly states ‘absurd’.403 
The South African Law Commission’s proposed Administrative Justice Bill (as discussed in 
chapter three) included provisions for the publication of registers and indexes of rules and 
standards.404 In addition, it proposed that if an administrator decides to make a rule ‘it must 
take appropriate steps to communicate the rule to those likely to be affected by it’.405 
The executive’s version of this bill as introduced to Parliament and the eventual Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act406 passed by Parliament, only made mention of a duty to 
communicate the rule in the case of notice and comment procedures.407 The proposal to 
require by law the creation of a register of index had been watered down in PAJA to the 
extent that it merely gives the minister the discretion to establish an advisory council, which 
                                                          
401 Available at: http://www.lawsofsouthafrica.up.ac.za 
402 Available at: https://opengazettes.org.za/about 
403 O’Regan op cit (n56) at 170. 
404 SA Law Commission, Administrative Justice Bill at section 13.  
405 Ibid at section 12(1)(a).  
406 3 of 2000. 
407 Ibid at section 4(3)(a). 
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amongst other things, could advise the him or her on whether to publish an index or 
register.408 Since the promulgation of PAJA, no such council has been established. 
In its 2002 report the Joint Subcommittee on Delegated Legislation also considered section 
101(3) of the Constitution and whether Parliament or the executive had the responsibility to 
ensure the accessibility of delegated legislation. 409 It argued that because this section was in 
chapter five of the Constitution, dealing with the President and the National Executive, it is 
clear that the executive has the primary responsibility to make delegated legislation more 
accessible.  
The Report recommended that Parliament propose to the executive that it investigate ways to 
make delegated legislation more accessible, which could include: 
 A central index/register of all acts and their delegated instruments; 
 The availability of the register in both printed and electronic form; 
 The register - in both printed and electronic form – to be distributed to all public 
libraries and municipal offices; 
 Bound volumes of the full text of regulations to be kept up to date and be widely 
available;  
 Ways to be explored of popularising subordinate instruments as regulations, given the 
high rate of illiteracy in South Africa; and 
 A provision in the standard-setting legislation to provide for the automatic lapsing of 
subordinate instruments after a certain period, unless they are reinstated. 410  
 
Some foreign legislatures are, as with their mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of 
subordinate legislate, far ahead of South Africa in terms of making delegated legislation 
accessible to the public. 
In Canada the Statutory Instruments Act411 requires the publication of a quarterly 
consolidated index of all regulations and amendments to regulations in force at any time after 
the end of the preceding calendar year.  
In the United States of America the rules and regulations of federal agencies are arranged by 
subject in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). They are then arranged into 50 CFR titles 
– for instance ‘Energy’ (title 10), ‘Business Credit and Assistance’ (title 13), and ‘Highways’ 
(title 23). The CFR is updated once a year to reflect any changes or amendments.412  
                                                          
408 Ibid at section 11(g).  
409 Parliament of South Africa op cit (n38). 
410 Ibid at 25.  
411 Statutory Instruments Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. S-22) at section 14.   
412 Available at: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/ECFR?page=browse. 
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Australia’s Legislation Act413 requires the establishment and maintenance of the Federal 
Register of Legislation which serves as a register of acts, legislative instruments and 
notifiable instruments.414 It also requires that a rule-maker must lodge a legislative instrument 
for registration as soon as practicable after the instrument is made.415  
In 1993 O’Regan ruminated on the potential cost of a national register of all subordinate 
legislation416, but with advances in data processing and the spread of the internet, this cost 




















                                                          
413 Legislation Act, 2003.  
414 Ibid section 15A.  
415 Ibid section 15G. 
416 O’Regan op sit (n56) at 170. 
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8. Future Scrutiny Mechanisms  
 
After more than 20 years of our Constitution being in force, Parliament’s drawn-out attempts 
at creating a mechanism to oversee delegated legislation have failed.   
At the very minimum there is not even national legislation which requires the tabling of all 
delegated legislation in Parliament, despite the Constitution providing for this in section 
101(4). The current Interpretation Act only requires that Parliament be given notice when an 
instrument is made.  
Individual acts can stipulate that regulations made in terms of that act must be tabled in 
Parliament for consultation, notice or approval. It was these types of regulations which the 
Interim Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation scrutinised – in conjunction 
with portfolio committees – during its short existence.  
Any future attempts to revive Parliament’s scrutiny mechanism must start with national 
legislation requiring the tabling of all delegated legislation. 
In addition, it must be decided whether all regulations will be subject to an approval or 
disapproval mechanism in Parliament (as in Australia) or whether each enabling act will 
determine how Parliament must deal with a specific set of regulations (as in the UK).  
One big issue to resolve will be whether to require tabling before or after promulgation, in 
other words tabling of draft delegated legislation or tabling of delegated legislation that is 
already in force.  
Another challenge would be how to facilitate productive interaction between the scrutiny 
committee and portfolio committees.  
The criteria according to which the Interim Committee scrutinised delegated legislation was 
very similar to the criteria employed by many foreign legislatures and the Committee did – 
despite its short existence – make some important findings with regards to drafting mistakes, 
retrospective clauses, the granting of unusual powers, and the creation of offences and 
penalties which was outside the scope of an act.  
Besides scrutinising delegated legislation on technical grounds, Parliament should also 
consider allowing debate on the underlying policy and merits of delegated legislation, as is 
done in the UK. For instance, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of 
Lords can draw attention to an instrument if it is ‘politically or legally important or gives rise 
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to issues of public policy likely to be of interest to the House’.417 This could serve to 
reinvigorate political interest in the scrutiny procedures.  
Another issue that continuously plagued the Joint Committee and the Interim Committee was 
the difficulty of finding time to meet and deliberate.  
The Clerk of Papers compiles a list of notices, proclamations and regulations tabled in 
Parliament as a reference for office use. This is not an official list, but gives an indication of 
the amount of instruments tabled in Parliament in each year of the fifth Parliament so far.  
In 2014, 135 instruments were tabled, in 2015 there were 180, in 2016 there were 254, and in 
2017 there were 205.418 If just 10 per cent of these instruments are regulations, it would mean 
a lot of work for any future scrutiny committee.  
A serious attempt at reviving the mechanism would also have to include a paradigm shift on 
the part of Parliament.  
The failure of the mechanism was not only indicative of a lack of will on the side of 
Parliament (made clear by how long it took the institution to establish only an interim 
committee), but also demonstrated that scrutinising delegated legislation can be both 
laborious and cumbersome because of the sheer volume of instruments and their technical 
nature. It does not always make for exciting politics.  
What is therefore required is a mechanism which gives Parliament oversight over delegated 
legislation, but which does not burden the institution to the point that it cannot function. 
The Interim Committee was advised by Parliament’s Legal Services, but any future attempt at 
reviving the Committee should include the appointment of specialist staff who specifically 
work for the Committee. It might be worth re-examining the mechanism proposed in 
Parliament in the 1940s whereby a dedicated officer scrutinises delegated legislation and 
reports to a scrutiny committee. Similarly, in Canada regulations are initially reviewed by the 
committee’s legal advisors and then brought to the attention of the committee if they do not 
conform. 
Political parties should also prioritise the appointment of competent members to the scrutiny 
committee, it should not be a second or third priority for member of Parliament.  
                                                          
417 House of Lord op cit (n319).  
418 Correspondence with Llewellynn Claassen, Parliament Clerk of Papers on 14 February 2018.  
78 
 
In Australia, Canada and Ghana they attempt to make the scrutiny effort bipartisan by 
requiring that a member of the opposition serve as chairperson or vice-chairperson. A 
proposal of this nature could elicit more participation from smaller political parties.  
One of the easiest ways to ensure that delegated legislation is of a high quality even before it 
reaches Parliament, is the creation of a drafting office for drafting and protocols. This was 
one of the suggestions made by the South African Law Commission’s Report on 
Administrative Justice, but was never pursued.   
While we wait for any type of standard setting in terms of tabling and/or approval 
requirements, portfolio committees should take up the task of making sure that bills do 
contain provisions requiring tabling, and possibly approval by Parliament, of any delegated 
legislation made after the bill becomes an act. 
Mechanisms that require tabling, scrutiny by committee, or motions to disallow would be 
labelled by some as ‘perfunctory or even useless’, but that is only if these procedures are 
practiced in isolation.419 If they operate conjunctively, there is no reason why they cannot 
provide adequate safeguards to the citizen.420  
Whether Parliament or the executive will embark on any additional reform remains to be 
seen. According to Hoexter it ‘seems unlikely that the government will ever again have the 
necessary incentive to impose further tedious administrative procedures on itself, or the 
political will to do so.’421  
It feels, she says, as if government ‘feels less threatened by the ‘undemocratic’ and 
‘destructive’ institution of [judicial] review than it does about mechanisms that are far more 







                                                          
419 Kersell Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation (1960) at 176. 
420 Ibid at 176. 
421 Hoexter op cit (n122) at 399. 
422 Ibid at 399 
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9. Conclusion  
This study began by addressing the seeming conflict between the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and Parliament’s practice of delegating the power to create subordinate legislation to 
the executive.   
It has been shown that our courts have fully acknowledged the existence of delegated 
legislation as part of our unique constitutional design and that our Constitution even allows 
for the creation of national legislation to govern the tabling and approval of these instruments 
in Parliament.  
However, since 1994 legislative attempts at improving our administrative law system have 
failed to adequately provide for the oversight of delegated legislation.  
Parliament itself took more than a decade before it established an interim mechanism for the 
scrutiny of delegated legislation and then the activities of the interim committee lasted a mere 
19 months.  
In South Africa the Gauteng Provincial Legislature is the only legislature that has established 
a permanent mechanism providing for the scrutiny of all regulations made by provincial 
functionaries.  
Some foreign legislatures, including several on the African continent, are far ahead of South 
Africa with regards to their scrutiny mechanisms, even if one only takes into account the 
legislative frameworks enacted for this purpose.  
Similarly, even in terms of making sure that delegated legislation is accessible to the public, 
both Parliament and the executive have failed to advance this constitutional imperative.  
Whether there will be any appetite for a renewed attempt at reviving or creating mechanisms 
to ensure the oversight of delegated legislation and so improve our administrative law system 
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